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ABSTRACT 
Kirkland, Rena A. Mental State Understanding During Aging: An Examination of 
Cognitively Effortful and Cognitively Efficient Mechanisms. Published Doctor of 
Philosophy dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2013. 
 
The human ability to understand the mental states of others is a fundamental skill 
necessary for social interactions.  Some researchers have argued that two cognitive 
systems underlie mental state understanding; one that is cognitively efficient and another 
that is cognitively effortful and partially mediated by explicit processes.  The purpose of 
the current study was to investigate mental state understanding in older adults (aged 60 to 
87) from the framework of examining these two systems.  To achieve these goals, the 
current study used two tasks that differed in the degree to which they involve implicit 
versus explicit processes.  A level-1 visual perspective taking task was employed to 
examine if older adults showed evidence of automatically processing another individual’s 
perspective (in this task, the “other” perspective was a digital avatar displayed on a 
computer screen).  A dual task was utilized to examine the impact of inhibitory control on 
level-1 visual perspective taking.  Explicit mental state understanding was examined with 
a theory of mind story task.  Finally, the digit span and symbol span from the Wechsler’s 
Adult Intelligence Scale-IV were used as measures of verbal and spatial working memory 
respectively. 
 Results indicated that older adults (n = 42) were prone to egocentric interference 
effects, suggesting that older adults own perspective interferes with taking another 
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individual’s perspective.  No evidence was found that older adults automatically process 
another individual’s perspective; thus, no evidence was found of a cognitively efficient 
mechanism for mental state understanding during aging.  The dual-task results indicated 
that only the self perspective was significantly slower for the dual task compared to the 
level-1 visual perspective taking alone.  
 A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine the degree to which verbal 
and spatial working memory mediated theory of mind and level-1 visual perspective 
taking performance.  Results indicated that verbal but not spatial working memory 
contributed to theory of mind performance.  Verbal and spatial working memory did not 
contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking.  This was the first study to examine 
cognitively efficient and cognitively effortful mechanisms in mental state understanding 
in older adults.  The results offer an explanation for previous research that suggests 
mental state understanding in older adults declines above what can be explained by 
general cognitive decline.  Furthermore, the results offer several theoretical contributions 
regarding the nature and limits of a cognitively efficient system for mental state 
understanding.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The human capacity for mental state understanding far surpasses that of any other 
species and is a fundamental cognitive capacity necessary for everyday social interactions 
(Saxe, 2006).  Mental state understanding is considered to include a wide range of skills, 
such as decoding nonverbal behavior, emotion perception, and reasoning about other’s 
mental states.  The ability to understand the contents of another individual’s mind is of 
such vital importance that when this ability is impaired, significant social deficits are 
observed (Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann, & Frith, 1997).  For example, research 
has found deficits in mental state understanding are significantly correlated with 
difficulties in everyday social interactions in autism spectrum disorders, (Baron-Cohen, 
Howlin, & Hill, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985), schizophrenia (Penn, Corrigan, 
Bentall, Racenstein, & Newman, 1997), post-traumatic stress disorder (Schmidt & 
Zachariae, 2009), and traumatic brain injuries (Bibby & McDonald, 2005).  Conversely, 
there is evidence to suggest that individuals who excel in mental state understanding are 
more likely to interact with others cooperatively (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).  To illustrate 
the importance of judging the contents of another individual’s mind, consider the 
following situation: yesterday I was struggling with two children and several pieces of 
luggage before ascending an escalator at the airport.  Realizing someone was behind me, 
I glanced back and gauged that the woman was sympathetic regarding my struggles.  
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Concluding that the woman was not in a rush nor irritated at my debacle, I continued 
ahead of her; however, if I had judged that the woman was irritated and or in a hurry, I 
would have stepped aside to let her pass.  Despite the continuous stream of complex 
cognitive processing involved in a social interaction such as this, the human brain handles 
the input and drives behavior with little effort (Beer & Ochsner, 2006).  
As illustrated in the example above, successful human interaction depends, in 
part, on the ability to understand the intentions, beliefs, and desires of others (Stone, 
2005).  During aging, impairments in mental state understanding have been well 
documented (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) although 
the mechanisms underlying the observed deficits are not clearly understood (Moran, 
2013).  This is in large part due to the complex cognitive processes involved in 
understanding other’s mental states.  For instance, cognition involved in understanding 
other people’s mental states includes processes such as: visual-perception of other agents, 
usually conspecifics (Heider & Simmel, 1994); attentional processes (Leslie, Friedman, 
& German, 2004); facial expression processing, including eye gaze direction (Langton, 
Watt, & Bruce, 2000); emotion processing (Adolphs, 2002), and executive functioning 
(Ahmed & Miller, 2011). 
The underlying cognitive processes involved in mental state understanding have 
been argued to include both cognitively effortful as well as fast and automatic processes 
(Frith & Frith, 2008; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Sabbagh, 2004).  Theory of mind, the 
ability to make mental state inferences in order to predict behavior (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978), involves explicit cognitive processes.  For instance, if you were to 
predict where I am going to search for my computer, then you would need to consider my 
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belief regarding where my computer is located.  Thus, tasks that measure theory of mind 
ability require that participant’s explicitly reason about mental states, such as beliefs. 
Studies with children and adult samples suggest that theory of mind correlates with 
executive functioning (e.g., Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Sabbagh, Xu, 
Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006), working memory (e.g., Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010), and 
verbal ability (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Hughes, 1998; 
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), demonstrating that 
individual differences in mental state understanding are partially mediated by cognitively 
effortful processes. 
Unlike the cognitive resources required for theory of mind tasks, other aspects of 
mental state understanding may not involve cognitively effortful processes.  One such 
capacity is the ability to differentiate between our own perspective and the perspective of 
another individual.  Research suggests that taking the visual perspective of another 
individual is less dependent on executive functioning, memory, and language (Samson, 
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010).  Compared to explicit theory of 
mind abilities, which emerges between the ages of 3 and 4 along with the burgeoning 
cognitive capacities of executive function, working memory and verbal ability, the 
capacity for visual perspective taking emerges relatively early (Moll & Tomasello, 2006; 
Song & Baillargeon, 2008).  For instance, indirect evidence from infant studies suggests 
that 14-month olds are capable of taking into account the visual perspective of another 
individual (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007).  Thus, it has been argued that mental state 
understanding also involves cognitively efficient processes in addition to cognitively 
effortful resources (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010).  The purpose of the current 
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study was to explore mental state understanding during aging utilizing two tasks that vary 
in the degree to which they require cognitively effortful versus efficient processes.  
Mental State Understanding During Aging 
Over the past decade and a half, several studies have investigated if mental state 
understanding declines with age (e.g., Bailey & Henry, 2008; Happé, Winner, & 
Brownell, 1998).  A recent meta-analysis found moderate to large effects in favor of 
young compared to older adults on all mental state tasks examined (i.e., tasks utilizing 
multiple modalities and a variety of task demands, Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 
2012); however, research examining mental state understanding in older adults is 
complicated by age-related cognitive decline.  That is, during aging several cognitive 
capacities decline that are related to individual differences in mental state understanding.  
Most of the studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used theory 
of mind tasks, which are partially mediated by explicit cognitive processes.  Since aging 
is associated with declines in executive functioning (e.g., Verhaeghen, 2011) and 
working memory (e.g., Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005), it is necessary to extricate the degree 
to which age-related decline in mental state understanding is influenced by these 
cognitive resources (Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2011).  
Studies that have used theory of mind story tasks, which involve reading a short 
vignette and inferring the mental state of a character, suggest that mental state deficits 
during aging are at least partially mediated by age-related cognitive decline (e.g., German 
& Hehman, 2006).  Studies using less verbally demanding tasks (e.g., cartoon tasks and 
static pictures of eyes), however, also report age-related deficits, which may be 
influenced by declining cognitive processes, such as working memory (Henry et al., 
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2012).  One of the goals of the current study was to investigate the degree to which 
working memory mediates mental state understanding during aging.  Specifically, I 
examined how verbal and spatial working memory contributed to a theory of mind story 
task as well as a task that involves cognitively efficient processes. 
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking 
Level-1 visual perspective taking is demonstrated when a person can visually 
track what someone else can and cannot see (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981).  
Level-1 visual perspective taking differs from theory of mind tasks in that a participant 
needs only to consider the visual viewpoint of another individual and not their mental 
state.  A series of studies using a level-1 visual perspective task found that children and 
adults are prone to interference from inconsistent perspectives (Samson et al.,2010; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010).  Specifically, Samson et al. (2010) found 
that participants demonstrated two types of interference effects: egocentric (i.e., 
participants were slower and more error prone when asked to judge an agent’s 
perspective when their own perspective was inconsistent) and altercentric (i.e., 
participants were slower and more error prone when asked to judge self-perspective when 
the agent’s perspective was inconsistent).  Samson et al. interpreted the altercentric 
interference as evidence that participants spontaneously judged the agent’s perspective 
even when they were not instructed to do so.   
In a study using a dual-task design, Qureshi and colleagues (2010) employed the 
level-1 visual perspective taking task with a secondary executive functioning task.  The 
aim of using the dual-task paradigm was to investigate the role of executive processes on 
the primary perspective taking task.  Based on the results, the authors concluded that 
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level-1 visual perspective taking does not require executive functioning.  Collectively, the 
results from these studies suggest that information processing for some aspects of mental 
state understanding may proceed relatively efficiently (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & 
Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010).  To my knowledge, no studies have investigated 
level-1 perspective taking in older adults.  In contrast to the age-related deficits found in 
tasks that have been shown to require explicit cognitive processes (i.e., theory of mind 
tasks), level-1 perspective taking may remain relatively intact during aging.  This 
hypothesis has not yet been explored and was one of the primary goals of the current 
study.  
Need for the Study 
Studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used theory of 
mind tasks, which have been shown to involve high-level cognitive processes (e.g., 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007).  Consequently, it is 
necessary to examine the degree to which age-associated decline in mental state 
understanding is mediated by general cognitive impairments versus a specific impairment 
in understanding mental states.  The literature to date suggests that mental state 
understanding deteriorates during normal aging (Henry et al.,, 2012); however, many 
questions remain regarding the cognitive processes mediating the observed decline.  
Moreover, researchers have emphasized that future studies should investigate the degree 
to which automatic and efficient versus controlled and effortful processes are involved in 
various aspects of mental state understanding (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012).  Although a variety of instruments have been utilized to 
examine mental state understanding during aging, typically, the tasks involve explicit 
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cognitive reasoning.  Given the robust finding of age-related decline in mental state 
understanding, older adults are an ideal sample to investigate the hypothesis that 
cognitively efficient processes are involved in level-1 visual perspective taking.  In other 
words, since aging is associated with declining cognitive processes, an older adult sample 
provides a useful test group for examining cognitively efficient processes.  If older adults 
show evidence of retaining cognitively efficient processes in spite of the cognitive 
decline typically associated with aging, then this would provide evidence that efficient 
processes are involved in some aspects of mental state understanding. 
Research suggests that individual differences in mental state understanding are 
associated with social competence such as, solving social problems, communication 
skills, and moral reasoning (Couture, Granholm, & Fish, 2011; Dunn, 1996; Liddle & 
Nettle, 2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007).  Moreover, when individuals 
suffer from impairments in mental state understanding their ability to socially interact is 
substantially reduced (e.g., Krych-Applebaum et al., 2007; Pollice et al., 2002).  During 
aging, there is evidence to suggest that theory of mind deficits are related to reduced 
participation in social activities (Bailey, Henry, & von Hipple, 2008).  Considering that 
the ability to make mental state attributions is related to social functioning, and older 
adults show moderate to large deficits compared to young adult samples (Henry et al., 
2012), it follows that investigating the mechanisms underlying age-related declines may 
have important implications.  In a recent review of mental state understanding in aging, 
Moran (2013) emphasized that future research should seek to unravel the degree to which 
general cognitive resources impact the observed impairments.  With the goal of 
improving social understanding for older adults, Moran suggested that it is essential to 
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know where remediation efforts should be devoted.  That is, elucidating which cognitive 
processes influence age-related deficits in mental state understanding may have important 
implications for improving social skills during aging.  Considering the consequences of 
suffering a reduced capacity for mental state understanding, I believe it is a worthwhile 
endeavor to investigate the underlying cognitive mechanisms of age-related decline 
during aging. 
Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of the current study was to explore mental state understanding during 
aging utilizing two tasks that vary in the degree to which they involve cognitively 
efficient versus effortful processes.  A dual-task involving level-1 visual perspective 
taking and a secondary executive functioning task were used to examine cognitively 
efficient processes.  A theory of mind story task was used to examine cognitively 
effortful processes.  The primary objective was to investigate if there is evidence of 
cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual perspective taking in an older adult 
sample.  To undertake this first goal, a dual task was utilized to examine if older adults 
show altercentric interference (i.e., slower and more error prone when asked to judge 
one’s own perspective when the other perspective is inconsistent) when concurrently 
performing a secondary executive functioning task.  To be precise, if older adults show 
evidence of calculating the agent’s perspective during dual-task trials, then this would 
suggest that cognitively efficient processes are involved in visual perspective taking (i.e., 
a concurrently performed secondary executive function task does not disrupt the 
calculation of the agent’s perspective).  The secondary goal of the current study was to 
examine the contributions of verbal and spatial working memory in a level-1 visual 
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perspective taking task as well as a theory of mind story task.  Specifically, the current 
study investigated the following questions:  
QI  Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual  
 perspective taking in an older adult sample?   
 
Q2 In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial  
 working memory contribute to theory of mind?  
 
Q3 In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working  
 memory contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking? 
 
Glossary of terms 
Age-related general cognitive decline - A suite of mental capacities associated with 
decreasing performance during the aging process.  
Altercentric effect - Cognitive interference that occurs when knowing the perspective of 
another individual hinders making a judgment regarding one’s own perspective (i.e., two 
perspectives are inconsistent, which results in an interference effect for the judgment of 
self perspective). 
Dual task - A neuropsychological measure that includes the combination of two tasks 
that must be performed concurrently.   
Egocentric effect - Cognitive interference that occurs when self perspective hinders 
making a judgment regarding another individual’s perspective (i.e., two perspectives are 
inconsistent, which results in an interference effect for the judgment of the other 
individual’s perspective). 
Executive functioning - Higher order cognitive processes including planning, inhibition 
control, and mental flexibility.  Some authors consider working memory as a component 
process of executive functioning; however, in the current study I am considering working 
memory separately.  Executive functioning is operationalized in this study by an 
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inhibition task in which participants were asked to respond to an auditory presentation of 
the words “day” or “night” by responding in the opposite direction of the words.  That is, 
when participants hear the word “day” the correct response was to press a picture of a 
“moon” on a computer mouse; when they hear the word “night” the correct response was 
to press a picture of a “sun”. 
Level-1 perspective taking - The ability to visually track what another individual can or 
cannot see.   
Mental state understanding - This term is used broadly to capture the human ability to 
perceive, encode, and reason about mental states such as, beliefs, desires, emotions, 
intentions, and visual perspectives of others.  The cognitive mechanisms involved in 
mental state understanding have been argued to include both cognitively efficient (i.e., 
implicit) and effortful (i.e., explicit) processes.  
Spatial working memory - The mental capacity for the storage, manipulation, and 
processing of spatial information. 
Theory of mind - The ability to make mental state inferences in order to predict behavior 
Theory of mind story task - A task in which participants read short vignettes including 
two or more characters followed by questions that ask the participants to make mental 
state inferences regarding the characters in the story.  This task has been demonstrated to 
involve explicit cognitive processes such as, executive functioning, working memory, 
and verbal reasoning. 
Working memory - The cognitive capacity that includes the storage, manipulation, and 
processing of information; researchers often consider working memory as a component 
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(i.e., subprocess) of executive functioning, however, for this study, working memory was 
considered separately from executive functioning.  
Verbal working memory - The mental capacity for the storage, manipulation, and 
processing of verbal information.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Studies examining age-related changes in mental state understanding have 
primarily utilized theory of mind tasks, which require a relatively high degree of explicit 
cognitive resources.  Research using several different types of theory of mind tasks, (e.g., 
stories and videos), suggests that mental state understanding declines during aging; 
however, several cognitive capacities decline during aging that are also related to 
individual differences in mental state understanding.  Given that theory of mind abilities 
have been shown to be associated with executive functioning (e.g., Duval, Piolino, 
Bejanin, Eustach, & Desgranges, 2011; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000), 
working memory (e.g., Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006), and verbal ability (e.g., Dunn & 
Brophy, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), researchers have investigated if age-
related changes in theory of mind may be due to more general cognitive decline.  The 
literature up to the present time, however, is unclear regarding the specific role of general 
cognitive decline on age-related theory of mind deficits.   
Contrary to the explicit cognitive processes involved in theory of mind tasks, 
some aspects of mental state understanding have been suggested to include cognitively 
efficient processing (Samson, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010).  For 
example, evidence suggests that level-1 visual perspective taking, which includes being 
able to track the visual perspective of another individual (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 
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2007), may proceed relatively efficiently (Qureshi et al., 2012).  Accordingly, some 
researchers have argued that a full account of mental state understanding includes both 
cognitively effortful and cognitively efficient processes (Frith & Frith, 2008).  In line 
with the evidence that some aspects of mental state understanding operates efficiently 
while explicit mental state understanding involves cognitively demanding processes, 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed that two systems underlie mental state 
understanding.  In their model, one system is characterized as implicit and includes 
automatic processes.  Apperly and Butterfill propose that a second system, which 
operates in parallel with the implicit system, is more flexible and requires explicit 
processing.  Therefore, the two systems are considered to involve cognitively efficient 
and cognitively effortful processes respectively.   
The inclusion of automatic and controlled processes in social cognition has been 
discussed in a wide range of social psychological topics (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Lieberman, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 1999).  Several authors have specifically proposed 
that mental state understanding is driven by two systems (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 
2005; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Tager-Flushberg & Sullivaan, 2000).  The dual route as 
conceptualized by Apperly and Butterfill (2009) offers several specific theoretical points.  
First, the cognitively efficient system comes at a price of being inflexible whereas the 
effortful system is flexible and can process complex information.  Second, Apperly (2010, 
2013) argues that the cognitively efficient system must be constrained by limits and 
understanding the nature of these limits will be useful for advancing the dual route model.  
Third, this framework accommodates evidence that suggests infants are capable of 
implicit false belief understanding (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & 
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Sperber, 2007) even though children do not pass explicit false belief tasks until between 
the ages of three or four years old (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  In a false belief 
paradigm (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) children observe an object being hidden in a 
location, which is also observed by another character.  Subsequently, the character leaves 
the room and the object is moved to a different location.  To pass a false belief task, a 
child must explicitly demonstrate (i.e., give a verbal response) that the character holds a 
false-belief and that the false belief will motivate their behavior (e.g., where they will 
look for a toy, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  After 
decades of research utilizing many variants of the false belief paradigm, researchers agree 
that children cannot pass this explicit false belief task until after the age of three (.g., 
Astington & Jenkins, 1999).  However, using indirect measures (e.g., looking time), 
researchers have found evidence that infants obtain implicit awareness of false-beliefs 
(e.g., Clements & Perner, 1994; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  Apperly and 
Butterfill’s (2009) two-system framework provides a theoretical account for these 
seemingly contradictory bodies of literature.  To date, no studies have investigated 
cognitively efficient mechanisms in mental state understanding in older adults.  In light of 
the robust findings of age-related cognitive decline, it would be valuable to examine if 
there is evidence of cognitively efficient processes involved in mental state understanding 
during aging.   
With the goal of examining the underlying cognitive processes of mental state 
understanding during aging, the current study used two tasks that differed in the degree to 
which they involve explicit cognitively mediated processes versus efficient processes.  
Namely, in addition to a theory of mind task, which requires cognitively effortful 
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processes, a level-1 visual perspective taking task was used to investigate efficient 
processes.  Thus, as outlined in the previous chapter, the goal of the current study was 
two fold.  First, to examine older adult performance on a level-1 visual perspective taking 
task with the purpose of investigating cognitively efficient processes in mental state 
understanding during aging.  Additionally, to examine how verbal and spatial working 
memory contributes to the performance of these two tasks in an older adult sample.  
The following literature review is organized into three broad sections for the 
following purposes:  First, to provide a brief review of cognitive aging literature relevant 
to the current study.  Second, offer an assessment of the literature to date examining 
mental state understanding during aging.  Third, to present a description of the methods, 
results, and conclusions of three studies that used a level-1 visual perspective taking task.  
Ultimately, the goal of the current chapter is to draw together the research investigating 
mental state understanding in older adults as well as to present evidence that suggests 
some aspects of mental state understanding involve cognitive processes that proceed 
relatively efficiently.  Finally, the current chapter will conclude with a summary and the 
hypotheses for the current study.  
Cognitive Aging Related to Mental State Understanding 
A substantial amount of research suggests that executive functioning (e.g., 
Hughes, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999; Perner & Lang, 2000) and working memory 
capacity (Davis & Pratt, 1995; Hughes, 1998; Keenan, Olson, & Marini, 1998; Keenan, 
1998) impacts the ability of preschool children being able to pass a false belief task 
independent of age and other abilities.  For instance, a meta-analysis examining the 
relation between children’s performance on executive functioning and false belief 
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understanding found a mean correlation coefficient of 1.08, indicating a strong effect for 
the relation between these abilities (Perner & Lang, 2000).  In addition, several studies 
have found that individual differences in false belief performance are related to executive 
functioning (e.g., Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 2006; Bora, 
Sehitoglu, Aslier, Atabay, & Veznedaroglu, 2007) and working memory abilities (Lin et 
al., 2010) in young adult samples.  Since normal aging is associated with declining 
mental capacities in several cognitive domains (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), researchers 
examining mental state understanding during aging must take into consideration age-
related cognitive decline. 
Normal Aging 
Normal aging involves cognitive decline that is not considered to be associated 
with impairment of daily functioning (Salthouse, 2010).  In contrast to normal aging, 
dementia is a set of global cognitive symptoms associated with significant dysfunction 
(McHugh & Folstein, 1977).  Research suggests that for individuals 65 years old the 
prevalence of dementia is 4%, with rates doubling approximately every 5-6 years 
thereafter; thus, approximately 15% of all 80 year olds have some form of dementia 
(Prince et al., 2013).  The purpose of the current study is to investigate mental state 
understanding during normal aging; therefore, the literature review that follows does not 
consider cognitive decline associated with dementia.  
  Despite the observed variability among individuals (Hultsch, MacDonald, & 
Dixon, 2002; Salthouse, 2010) and functions (Schaie, 2005), healthy aging is associated 
with cognitive decline after the age of 60 (Schaie, 1996; 2005).  Accordingly, most of the 
studies examining older adult performance on mental state understanding tasks have 
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included adults over 60 years old (e.g., German & Hehman, 2006).  Three domains of 
cognitive aging are particularly relevant to the literature investigating mental state 
understanding during aging: processing speed, executive functioning, and working 
memory.  The purpose of the following section is twofold: (a) to review three areas of 
cognitive aging relevant to mental state understanding; and (b) to outline areas of 
cognitive decline that could specifically impact the tasks in the current study.  
Aging and Processing Speed   
One of the most robust findings in the cognitive aging literature is that mental 
processing speed (i.e., speed of information processing) slows during the aging process 
(Bashore, 1989; Salthouse, 1985, 1996; Verhaegen & Cerella, 2008).  While there are a 
variety of methods used to measure processing speed, reaction time is one of the most 
frequently used in cognitive aging studies (Chen & Li, 2008).  Using reaction time as a 
dependent variable, slowed mental processing is indicated by slower reaction times on a 
variety of tasks for older compared to young adults.  For example, many cognitive aging 
studies examine young compared to older adult’s reaction times on simple reaction time 
tasks (e.g., Earles & Salthouse, 1995).  Specifically, a visual stimulus is presented and 
participants must respond with a button press on a computer as soon as they see the 
stimulus.  Another commonly used task in older adult studies are choice reaction time 
tasks.  Participants are required to make a selection from two or more different choices of 
stimuli as quickly as possible, which are presented randomly (e.g., Der & Deary, 2006).  
In addition to reaction time as a measure of processing speed, researchers also use 
reaction time as a dependent variable to examine attention (Tse, Balota, Yap, Duchek, & 
McCabe, 2010), perception (Ben-David & Schneider, 2009), language processing (Caza 
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& Moscovitch, 2005), memory (Kumar, Rakitin, Nambisan, Habeck, & Stern, 2008), and 
executive functioning (Chen & Li, 2008).  For instance, an in-depth analysis of reaction 
time distributions was used to investigate attention in older adults (Tse et al., 2010).  In 
particular, cognitive researchers often use reaction time as a dependent measure for 
experimental designs where independent variables are manipulated and the effects of the 
various conditions are investigated by way of examining differential response times for 
the conditions (Deary, Liewald, & Nissan, 2011).  
A common finding in reaction time studies is that older adult samples demonstrate 
greater reaction time variance compared to young adult samples.  Often, the standard 
deviation in older adults has been reported to be 1.5 times greater compared to young 
adults (Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2000).  In addition to the larger variability across 
individuals, there is also greater within person inconsistency compared to younger adult 
samples (Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, Hancock, & Quilter, 1994; Williams, Strauss, 
Hultsch, & Hunter, 2007; Anstey, 1999; Hultsch et al., 2002).  The degree to which older 
adults demonstrate inconsistent performance has been shown to depend on the type of 
task (West, Murphy, Armilio, Craik, & Stuss, 2002) and the relative speed of individuals.  
Williams, Hultsch, Strauss, Hunter, and Tannock (2005) found that older adults with fast 
reaction times were more consistent compared to those individuals falling in the right 
hand tail of the distribution.  Overall, moment-to-moment inconsistency is observed to be 
greatest in individuals with the slowest reaction times.  Even though variability both 
between and within individuals tends to increase with age (Hultsch, MacDonald, & 
Dixon, 2002), studies using reaction time continue to be a common approach to 
investigate research questions using a variety of tasks in aging samples. 
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Although reaction latencies are overall slower in older compared to younger 
adults, some domains show differential age-related slowing (Cerella, 1985; Verhaegen, & 
Cerella, 2008).  For instance, using meta-analytic techniques, Lima, Hale, and Myerson 
(1991) found that older adults demonstrate less slowing than younger adults in tasks 
using verbal compared to nonverbal stimuli.  That is, while reaction time using both 
verbal and nonverbal stimuli decline across age, older adults perform significantly slower 
on nonverbal tasks (i.e., nonlexical tasks) compared to verbal tasks (i.e., lexical tasks).  In 
particular, processing speed has been found to be especially impaired in older adults on 
tasks involving spatial information (e.g., Tomer & Cunningham, 1993; Babcock, Laguna, 
& Roesch, 1997).  Even though evidence suggests that age-related slowing in processing 
speed varies based on the type of domain (e.g., lexical, spatial, arithmetic, perceptual), 
evidence overwhelmingly suggests that cognitive slowing occurs across all tasks with age 
(Bashore, van der Molen, Ridderinkhof, & Wylie, 1997; Madden, 1989; Myerson, 
Wagstaff, & Hale, 1994; Perfect, 1994; Schultz, 1994). 
Aging and Executive Functioning 
Many researchers consider executive functioning to include a suite of high-level 
cognitive processes consisting of inhibition control, planning, and mental flexibility 
(Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000; Suchy, 2009); however, researchers are not in complete agreement 
regarding how executive functioning should be defined and measured (Alvarez & Emory, 
2006; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Miyake, Emerson, & Friedman, 2000; Welsh, 2002).  
Since cognitive aging researchers suffer the challenge of agreeing upon how executive 
functioning should be operationalized, there is wide disagreement regarding which tasks 
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best conceptualize executive function decline in older adults.  Furthermore, fundamental 
questions are debated (Daniels, Toth, & Jacoby, 2006) such as whether or not age-
associated deficits in executive functioning can be explained by one central ability that 
declines during aging or, alternatively, if distinct executive components such as, 
inhibition control versus task shifting, are differentially impaired (Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).  Nonetheless, overall there is substantial evidence 
that older adults perform worse than younger adults on executive functioning tasks, in 
particular for inhibition and mental flexibility (e.g., DiGirolamo et al., 2001; Kramer, 
Hahn, & Gopher, 1999; Wecker, Kramer, Wisniewski, Delis, & Kaplan, 2000).  While 
acknowledging that the debate is far from settled regarding whether age-related executive 
functioning decline should be considered through a unified or component specific lens 
(Daniels, Toth, & Jacoby, 2006), evidence suggests that executive functioning decline 
begins as early as the third decade (Salthouse, 2009a). 
A recent meta-analytic investigation of aging and executive function examined 
three aspects of executive control: (a) inhibition control (i.e., resistance to interference); 
(b) coordinative ability; and (c) task shifting (Verhaeghen, 2011).  The ability to 
coordinate was assessed through studies using dual-task designs, which showed a small 
but reliable age effect (Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003; Verhaeghen & 
Cerella, 2002).  The most reliable decline was found for coordinative ability and task 
shifting (i.e., divided attention and the maintenance of two different mental task sets).  
One of the tasks that I used in the current study utilized a dual-task design, thus, the 
evidence that coordinative ability and task shifting shows reliable age-related decline is 
particularly relevant to the current study.  
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One aspect that typically is agreed upon is that executive functioning consists of 
effortful processes that guide behavior (Banich, 2009).  Since I am interested in 
examining cognitively effortful versus efficient mechanisms in mental state 
understanding, the evidence of age-related decline in executive functioning has important 
implications for the current study.  Namely, I used a dual task; previous research suggests 
that compared to young adults, older adults suffer disproportionate dual task 
impairments.  The implications of the dual task on older adult performance for the current 
study are considered later in this chapter. 
Aging and Working Memory   
A substantial amount of research suggests that measures of working memory (i.e., 
the storage, manipulation, and processing of information, (Baddeley, 1986; Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) decline across the lifespan and that various components of 
working memory show differential decline (e.g., Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, & Hale, 
2000).  Myerson, Emery, White and Hale (2003) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of 
the normative data from the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) and found evidence of 
differential decline between tasks.  A negative linear slope was found for both spatial and 
digit span scores with the former demonstrating significantly more decline than the latter; 
whereas, a curvilinear pattern was found for number sequencing.  The authors concluded 
that these patterns are suggestive of at least two possible mechanisms involved in age-
related memory changes.  Specifically, the linear decline maybe associated with 
mechanisms related to the storage of information, whereas the curvilinear decline maybe 
associated with mechanisms related to executive control aspects of working memory (i.e., 
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both storage and processing), which decrease disproportionately with age (Myerson et al., 
2003).   
Collectively, evidence suggests that complex span tasks, which require 
maintenance and processing, show greater age decline compared to simple span tasks, 
which requires maintenance only.  For instance, Wingfield, Stine, Lahar, and Aberdeen, 
(1988) held the type of memory items consistent when comparing complex versus simple 
span task performance; results indicated an age-related deficit for complex but not simple 
span tasks.  A meta-analysis found simple span tasks demonstrated moderate age-related 
decline (forward digit span, d= -.53) whereas, complex span tasks demonstrated large 
age-related declines (d= -1.01 and -1.54, sentence span and listening span, respectively, 
Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005).   
Thus far, I have reviewed three domains of age-related cognitive decline that have 
been found to be associated with performance declines in mental state understanding 
during aging:  processing speed, executive functioning, and working memory.  One of my 
primary goals in the section that follows is to explore the degree to which these cognitive 
processes may mediate the performance of mental state understanding in older adult 
samples.  
Mental State Understanding in Older Adults 
 
The studies to date examining mental state understanding during aging have 
primarily used theory of mind tasks, which, in varying degrees, involve explicit cognitive 
processes.  For instance, several studies have used theory of mind story tasks in which 
participants read a vignette of two characters interacting and are asked to make an 
inference regarding one of the character’s mental states (e.g., Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, 
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& Taylor, 2002).  Another example involves second order theory of mind tasks, which 
assess recursive reasoning about embedded mental states.  That is, a second order task 
requires that participants make inferences about a person’s mental state about another 
individual’s mental state (e.g., what Al thinks Susan thinks).  Although the first study 
examining older adult theory of mind abilities did not find evidence of age-related 
decline (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), subsequent studies suggest that theory of 
mind performance does decline with advancing ages (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004).  When reviewing the literature it is important to consider that 
the reduced performance of older adults relative to young adults may be due to age-
related deficits in processing speed, executive function, and working memory that I 
reviewed in the first section of the current chapter.  Several studies (e.g., German & 
Hehman, 2006) have investigated this hypothesis; however, the evidence thus far, is 
somewhat mixed.  That is, there is evidence to suggest that some theory of mind deficits 
are mediated by processing speed, executive functioning, and/or working memory (e.g., 
Phillips, Bull, Allen, Insch, Burr, & Ogg, 2011).  There is also evidence to suggest that 
during aging, impairments in theory of mind tasks are independent of cognitive domains 
(e.g., Maylor et al., 2002).   
The evidence that supports the latter hypothesis indicating theory of mind 
impairments cannot be fully explained by general cognitive decline corroborates with 
research suggesting a specific cognitive network is related to social functioning.  The 
evidence that supports a neurocognitive architecture specific for social cognition comes 
primarily from two areas of research; one from patients with damage to the frontal lobes 
(e.g., Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) and amygdala (e.g., Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, 
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& Tranel, 2002) and the other from the literature investigating autism spectrum disorders 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, 2001).  Both of these lines of research 
point to modularity in social cognition due to intact cognitive processes in the face of 
moderate to severe impairments in social functioning (Adolphs, 2002).  This is not to say 
that age-related cognitive decline, especially in regards to executive functioning, does not 
negatively impact performance on mental state tasks.  In fact, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that age-related executive functioning impairment mediates mental 
state understanding decline in older adults.  In the section that follows, I review the 
evidence that supports this hypothesis and conclude with my assessment of the evidence 
to date. 
Mental State Understanding and 
General Cognitive Decline 
 
Apperly (2011) suggested that the role of executive processes might 
disproportionally impact older adults performance on explicit mental state understanding 
tasks.  Indeed, evidence from several studies using a variety of tasks supports this 
assertion (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustach, & Desgranges, 2011; Saltzman et al., 2000; 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007).  German and Hehman 
(2006) examined the performance of young and old adults on four theory of mind stories 
that were developed with the intention of systematically increasing the executive 
demands of each story.  Two of the stories required either true-belief or false-belief 
reasoning; previous research suggests that false-belief reasoning requires greater 
inhibition control compared to true-belief reasoning (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; 
Leslie & Polizzi, 1998).  The other two stories differed in terms of approach-desire or 
avoid-desire, with the latter requiring more executive resources compared to the former 
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(Cassidy, 1998).  Performance declines were found for both young and older adults as the 
executive demands increased; however, older adults performed disproportionately worse 
compared to younger adults on the stories that have been purported to involve higher 
executive functioning demands.  
Similar to findings with developmental samples, one component of executive 
functioning that has been implicated to impact theory of mind performance in older 
adults is inhibition control (German & Hehman, 2006).  Bailey and Henry (2008) found 
that older adult performance on theory of mind tasks with high-inhibition demands 
showed significantly greater decline compared to theory of mind tasks with low-
inhibition demands.  Furthermore, a measure of cognitive inhibition (i.e., Stroop task) 
mediated theory of mind performance but measures of memory, mental flexibility, and 
processing speed did not.  A series of hierarchical regression analyses conducted by 
German and Hehman (2006) indicated that older adult performance on the theory of mind 
story task was most strongly explained by processing speed and inhibitory control 
(measured by Stroop and Hayling’s sentence completion).  When reaction time was used 
as the dependent variable, inhibition was most strongly associated with theory of mind 
performance, whereas, speed of processing predicted the most variance in accuracy.   
Charlton, Barrick, Markus, and Morris (2009) measured older adult performance 
on the Strange Story Task (SST, participants read a short vignette involving a character’s 
mental state followed by a question regarding the mental state inference, Happé, 1994; 
Happé et al., 1998).  In addition, eight tasks tapping various cognitive functions were 
administered (Digit Span Backward, Letter-Number Sequencing, Trail Making, Towers, 
Wisconsin Card Sorting, letter fluency, category fluency, and Stroop).  SST performance 
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correlated with all neuropsychological tasks except for Towers and Letter-Number 
Sequencing.  The Letter-Number Sequencing is considered a working memory task. 
Therefore, in this study older adult working memory performance did not correlate with 
SST; however, measures of inhibition control did.  Furthermore, the authors conducted a 
mediation analysis (McKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007), which indicated that the 
relation between age and theory of mind decline was fully mediated by executive 
function, information processing speed, and performance intelligence and partially 
mediated by verbal intelligence. 
There is also evidence that decline in mental state reasoning is partially mediated 
by working memory declines (Maylor et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2011).  For instance, 
several studies did not find any age effects on first-order theory of mind tasks (i.e., 
inferences about one character’s mental states) but found that older adults performed 
worse than young adults on second-order theory of mind tasks (i.e., inferences about one 
person’s mental state about another individual’s mental state, Maylor et al., 2002; 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).  Since second order theory of mind tasks impose a 
higher working memory load compared to first order tasks, these findings suggest that as 
working memory demands increase, older adults perform worse than young adults.  In 
one study that found age-associated deficits on second order but not first order theory of 
mind story tasks, the authors analyzed the older adult error rates (McKinnon & 
Moscovitch, 2007).  Results indicated that almost 70% of the errors were due to their 
failure of considering multiple pieces of information or differing information of two 
different characters in the stories.   
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Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) found that older adults (m= 73 years) performed 
worse than younger adults (m= 30 years) on a theory of mind story task; however, there 
was no longer a significant age effect when fluid intelligence (i.e., reasoning and problem 
solving skills, Cattell, 1963) was accounted for.  Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) measured 
fluid intelligence with AH4 (Heim, 1970), which includes arithmetic, synonyms, verbal 
opposites, and analogies.  Of note, several latent variable studies have found that working 
memory is closely associated with fluid intelligence (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, 
Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).  That is, 
working memory has been shown to be the best predictor of fluid intelligence compared 
to other cognitive variables such as processing speed and short-term memory (Kane, 
Hambrick, & Conway, 2005).  Thus, it is possible that working memory capacity 
partially mediated the relationship between fluid intelligence and theory of mind ability 
in this study.  
The findings that executive functioning, particularly inhibition, and working 
memory partially mediates theory of mind performance in older adults are not surprising 
given the evidence that performance on theory of mind tasks are influenced by executive 
processes in children and young adult samples (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998).  Of 
course, even young adults show reduced performance on theory of mind tasks as 
executive processing demands increase (Lin et al., 2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007); however, since older adults perform worse on executive functioning tasks 
compared to young adult samples, one would expect that older adults would be 
disproportionally affected.  Indeed, as reviewed earlier, results from several studies 
indicate that older adults perform disproportionally worse than young adults on mental 
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state tasks as executive demands increase (e.g., German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & 
Moscovitch, 2007).   
Collectively, there is substantial evidence to suggest that age-related decline in 
mental state understanding is associated with general cognitive impairments.  Based on 
my analysis of the literature, and in line with Kemp, Després, Sellal, and Dufour’s (2012) 
review, the accumulation of research suggests that age-related deficits in making mental 
state attributions are at least partially mediated by processing speed, inhibitory control, 
and working memory decline.  For instance, studies suggest that impairments increase 
disproportionately for older adults as secondary executive functioning task demands 
increase (e.g., McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Riby, Perfect, & Stollery, 2004; 
Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003).  Furthermore, the findings that age-
related deficits on second order but not first order theory of mind tasks suggests that older 
adults display impairments only as executive demands increase (Maylor et al., 2002; 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).  In agreement with my analysis, Moran (2013) 
substantiated in his review that executive functioning and fluid intelligence, which he 
defines as including working memory and processing speed, explains some of the theory 
of mind impairments observed with age.   
To date, the age-related decline in mental state understanding has been 
demonstrated through theory of mind measures, which require explicit cognitive 
resources (Henry et al.,, 2012).  Given the strong evidence in support of age-related 
decline in theory of mind tasks, it is of interest to examine if some aspects of mental state 
understanding are preserved during the aging process.  A candidate process that has been 
argued to involve cognitively efficient mechanisms is level-1 visual perspective taking 
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(Qureshi et al., 2010).  The purpose of the next section is to consider level-1 visual 
perspective taking that has been suggested to involve cognitively efficient processes 
related mental state understanding.  In the section that follows, a series of studies are 
reviewed that investigated level-1 visual perspective taking in young adults and children.  
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking 
Evidence of a Cognitively Efficient  
System in Perspective Taking 
 
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) were interested 
in investigating if adults automatically process another persons’ perspective in certain 
situations.  In an experimental research design, participants made quick judgments on a 
level-1 perspective taking task.  Participants viewed a picture of a room with an agent 
(i.e., computer-generated graphic of a person) standing facing a wall with red dots 
displayed on the walls.   In some conditions, the agent could “see” the same number of 
red dots as the participant.  In other conditions, the red dots were behind the agent and 
thus, the number of dots the agent and the participant could see did not match (Figure 1). 
 
  
Figure  1 A     Figure 1 B  
 
Figure. 1.  Examples of Stimuli Presented in Samson et al. (2010). A) Participants and 
the agent had the same perspective of the dots (consistent conditions); B) Participants 
saw a different number of dots than the agent (inconsistent conditions).  
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After each trial, participants were asked to judge either, (a) how many dots they 
could see (self perspective), or (b) how many dots the agent could see (other perspective).  
In the first experiment, trials asking participants to judge either self or other perspectives 
were presented in random order within the same block.  The second experiment separated 
the type of questions being asked of the participants (i.e., self or the agent’s perspective) 
into distinct blocks; that is, one block only asked participants to judge one’s own 
perspective and a separate block only asked participants to judge the agent’s perspective.  
In the third experiment, participants completed blocks with only self perspective trials 
(i.e., they never judged the agent’s perspective).  Additionally, the third experiment 
added a control condition in which a rectangle-distractor (i.e., nonsocial condition) was 
used in place of the computer-generated figure (i.e., social condition).  
As predicted, egocentric interference effects were found; that is, participants were 
slower and more error prone in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions when they 
were asked to judge the agent’s perspective.  The surprising finding was that when 
participants were asked to judge their own perspective they were slower and more error 
prone in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions.  This indicated that participants 
did not ignore the agent’s perspective when being asked to judge how many dots they 
could see.  Particularly noteworthy, these altercentric effects were also found in the 
second and third experiments indicating participants calculated the agent’s perspective 
even under conditions when they were never asked to do so.  No altercentric effects were 
found for the nonsocial condition (i.e., the rectangle), which indicated that the 
interference effects found in the social conditions were not likely due to the configuration 
of the space but instead were associated with intrusions from the agent’s perspective.   
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The egocentric bias found in Samson et al. is in accord with other research 
suggesting egocentric biases (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & 
Gilovich, 2004; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, & Nye, 1996), which impacts judgments 
regarding someone else’s perspective when it is different from our own.  The novel 
finding in this study was the evidence that participants are also prone to altercentric 
biases, which impacts their subsequent judgments of what they can see (i.e., participants 
are slower and make more errors when the agent’s perspective differs from their own).  
This was the case even when participants were only instructed to answer what they could 
see.  The altercentric effect suggests that even when there was no reason for participants 
to judge the agent’s perspective, which was the case in the third experiment, participants 
still spontaneously processed the agent’s perspective.  
Previous research suggests that cognitively effortful processes are necessary to 
overcome egocentric biases (Epley & Gilovich, 2004; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 
2004; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998; Nickerson, 1999).  When considering the results 
from Samson et al. in addition to previous findings, it seems plausible that adjusting away 
from both egocentric and altercentric biases is cognitively effortful.  The largest effect 
found in Samson et al.’s study was for egocentric biases, suggesting that making 
judgments regarding someone else’s perspective when it is different from our own 
requires more cognitive effort compared to when making judgments regarding one’s own 
perspective when it is different from another.  That is, this finding suggests that an 
egocentric bias requires more effort to inhibit compared to an altercentric bias.  In sum, 
Samson et al.’s (2010) results provided two important pieces of evidence.  First, this was 
the first study to find an altercentric effect, which suggests that adults process at least 
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some aspects of other peoples’ perspective automatically.  Additionally, results indicated 
that in order to perform less egocentrically and altercentrically on perspective taking 
tasks, cognitive resources are recruited in order to inhibit the automatic processing.  
These conclusions are strengthened by the following two studies.  
Surtees and Apperly (2012) found both egocentric and altercentric effects using a 
similar visual-1 perspective taking task in a sample of children (6-10 years old) and 
adults.  In this study, the social condition used an agent depicted by a cartoon figure and 
the nonsocial conditions used yellow and blue rectangular-shaped sticks in replace of the 
agent.  Also, instead of reading sentences, the participants heard the instructions as to 
which perspective to judge.  Although adults performed better overall than the children 
(i.e., faster), the size of the interference effects were the same for both children and adults.  
That is, both samples demonstrated significantly slower reaction times for inconsistent 
compared to consistent trials when judging the other perspective (i.e., egocentric effect) 
as well as their own perspectives (i.e., altercentric effect).  This was the first study that 
used the same perspective taking task for both children and adult samples.  Even though 
adults performed overall better, the adults demonstrated the same interference effects as 
the children.  These results suggest that dealing with inconsistent perspectives is 
cognitively effortful in development as well as adulthood.  Additionally, results indicted 
that compared to the social condition the nonsocial condition did not reveal an 
altercentric effect signifying that participants only spontaneously judged the other 
perspective when the stimuli were social in nature.  This finding suggests that the 
altercentric interference is a result of participants engaging in perspective taking versus a 
consequence of the spatial configuration of the task.  
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Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010) suggested that the level-1 perspective task 
includes calculation and selection.  That is, participants are calculating both their own 
perspective in addition to the agent’s perspective and then subsequently selecting the 
relevant perspective (i.e., the agent’s or self) based on the given probe.  Based on this 
analysis, Qureshi and colleagues noted that if executive functioning resources are 
necessary for this task, then it is unclear if they are involved in calculation, selection, or 
both.  Qureshi et al. (2010) devised the first study to investigate whether executive 
function resources are specifically involved in selection but not calculation.  
Using a dual-task design, Qureshi et al. (2010) had participants perform an 
executive function task (i.e., Luria’s tapping task) in conjunction with the same level-1 
perspective-taking task as in Samson et al. (2010).  Luria’s tapping task (Luria, 1966) 
requires that participants listen to a recording of one or two tones and respond in 
opposition to what they heard (i.e., one key press if they heard two tones and vice versa).  
This inhibition task was used with the goal of examining the impact of executive 
functioning on selection and calculation processes with the following reasoning:   
(a) In regards to calculation, if executive functioning processes are required to 
calculate the agent’s perspective when it is irrelevant to the task (such as in the case when 
self perspective is required in inconsistent trials), then the secondary task should interrupt 
this calculation, therefore reducing altercentric effects.   
(b) In regards to selection, if executive functioning is required for selection of 
perspectives in level-1 perspective taking (i.e., the primary task), then the dual-task trials 
(i.e. with the secondary executive functioning task), should result in a greater processing 
costs for both consistent and inconsistent trials but should disproportionately affect the 
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inconsistent trials. This reasoning is based on evidence from Samson et al., which found 
participants made more errors and were slower when perspectives were inconsistent 
compared to consistent.  See Table 1 for a summary of the predictions made by Qureshi 
et al. regarding the effects of the executive functioning task on calculation and selection 
during the perspective taking task.   
 
Table 1 
 
 Qureshi et al.’s Predictions for the Effects of the Dual Task 
 
                         Role of executive function 
  
    Calculation 
 
Selection 
   
Self judgments 
 
Decreased altercentric interference 
  
Increased altercentric interference 
 
Other judgments  * 
 
Increased egocentric interference  
 
Note. * Qureshi et al. did not discuss a hypothesis in their article for the effects of 
executive functioning for the conditions of Other judgments. 
 
 
Results indicated that the dual-task trials resulted in larger processing costs 
compared to alone trials for both consistent and inconsistent perspectives; however, the 
dual-task trials produced disproportionately larger processing cost for the inconsistent 
conditions.  Thus, the second hypothesis was supported (i.e., dual-task trials resulted in 
larger processing costs compared to alone trials), leading Qureshi et al. to conclude that 
executive functioning is required for selecting between the two perspectives.  In other 
words, the secondary executive functioning task slowed participants to a greater extent 
when the perspectives were inconsistent due to the reduction of executive processes 
available when having to make a selection.   
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In contrast, the first hypothesis was not supported with results indicating a larger 
altercentric effect in dual task compared to alone trials (i.e., participants were slower and 
more error prone when judging their own perspective when the agent’s perspective was 
inconsistent with their own).  Therefore, the authors concluded that executive functioning 
is not required for calculation of the two perspectives.  This conclusion rests on the 
assumption that if executive functioning was necessary for participants to calculate the 
other perspective when being asked to judge their own perspective, then the secondary 
executive task (i.e., dual-task trials) would have reduced the cognitive resources available, 
and thus, participants would be faster when judging their own perspective because they 
are no longer calculating the agent’s perspective.  Instead, results suggest that participants 
continued to calculate the agent’s perspective even when engaged in a secondary 
executive task.  The finding of a larger altercentric effect in the dual-task trials is 
particularly noteworthy because this suggests that calculation of perspective is automatic.  
That is, for inconsistent trials when participants were asked for one’s own perspective, 
participants calculated the agent’s perspective even when performing a concurrent 
executive functioning task and there was no reason for the participant to do so.  
Qureshi et al. is the first study to investigate sub-processes involved in level-1 
visual perspective taking.  The results suggest that executive functioning capacities may 
be necessary for selection and not calculation.  It is important to note that the secondary 
executive task used in dual-task trials involve reaction inhibition and thus, this study 
points to the role of inhibition during selection processes.  That is, these results suggest 
that inhibition resources constrain selection but not calculation processes involved in 
level-1 visual perspective taking.   
   
 
 
36 
To summarize, these studies provided four important pieces of evidence.  First, 
the altercentric interference suggests that participants automatically calculated the agent’s 
perspective even when it was not relevant to the task.  Second, these findings suggest that 
in order to perform less egocentrically and altercentrically on perspective taking tasks, 
cognitive resources are recruited in order to inhibit more automatic processing.  Third, 
the results that both children and adults revealed the same interference effects suggest 
that the underlying cognitive processes involved in level-1 visual perspective taking in 
children do not change with development.  To be precise, even though the overall 
processing is more efficient (i.e., faster), adults continue to process their own perspective 
(i.e., egocentric interference) when being asked to judge another agent’s perspective and 
vice versa.  Finally, the dual-task study suggests that inhibition processes involved in 
executive functioning play a role in selection but not calculation components of level-1 
visual perspective taking.  This last finding suggests that level-1 visual perspective taking 
involves cognitively efficient processes.  
Notably, level-1 visual perspective taking has not been examined in older adults. 
The current study was the first to investigate if older adults are prone to altercentric 
interference effects.  Moreover, the current study examined the impact of inhibition 
resources on level-1 visual perspective taking performance in an older adult sample.  
Finally, it was of particular interest to examine if there was also evidence of cognitively 
efficient processes in calculating the agent’s perspective in an aging sample.  Considering 
that older adults are disproportionately impaired on dual tasks and demonstrate declines 
in explicit mental state understanding tasks, if evidence is found in an older adult sample 
that calculating the agent’s perspective involves efficient processes, then this would 
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provide further support for the argument of cognitively efficient processes being involved 
in certain aspects of mental state understanding. 
Summary 
Many of the studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used 
theory of mind story tasks in which participants read a passage regarding two characters 
and subsequently answer questions regarding the characters’ mental states (e.g., Maylor 
et al., 2002).  Other studies have used visual stimuli in which participants must infer the 
mental states from videos (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007), photos (e.g., the Eyes 
Test, Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 2002), or cartoons (e.g., Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & 
Archibald, 2000).  In 2012, a meta-analysis was published that examined theory of mind 
abilities in older adults.  The analysis included 23 datasets from 21 studies (published and 
unpublished) and found older adults (with a mean age of 65 years or older) performed 
worse compared to young adults on theory of mind tasks with an average effect size of -
.36 (Henry et al.,, 2012).  This negative effect size indicates that aging is associated with 
a moderate decline in theory of mind abilities.   
In addition to age-related declines in theory of mind tasks, however, an extensive 
body of research indicates that older adults are impaired relative to young adults in many 
cognitive domains.  Given that theory of mind has been shown to be associated with 
executive functioning and working memory in both developmental (e.g., Mutter, Alcorn, 
& Welsh, 2006; Sabbagh et al., 2006) and adult samples (e.g., Lin et al., 2010; Newton, 
& de Villiers, 2007), researchers have examined the contribution of these cognitive 
functions on theory of mind performance during aging.  Currently, there is evidence to 
suggest that processing speed, executive functioning, and working memory mediates 
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some of the observed decline during aging (e.g., Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 
2011).  More research is needed to unravel which specific aspects of general cognitive 
decline impact mental state understanding during aging.  Furthermore, it is unclear if 
some aspects of mental state understanding remain unimpaired during the aging process.  
Compared to theory of mind tasks, level-1 perspective taking may remain relatively intact 
during aging. 
Hypotheses 
In terms of level-1 visual perspective taking, I expect older adults to show both 
egocentric and altercentric interference effects.  These interference effects would be 
demonstrated if older adults are significantly faster on consistent (i.e., matching) 
compared to inconsistent (i.e., not matching) conditions.  Specifically, I expect older 
adults to show interference effects when being asked to judge another perspective 
(egocentric effect) and when being asked to judge self perspective (altercentric effect).   
In regards to the dual-task trials, the rationale for the current study follows that 
presented by Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010).  Firstly, the effect of dual-task trials 
on selection processes during the level-1 perspective taking was examined.  If executive 
functioning is necessary for participants to select the relevant perspective, then dual-task 
trials should result in larger processing costs for both consistent and inconsistent 
conditions with disproportionately large processing costs for inconsistent conditions.  
Secondly, the influence of the dual task on calculation of perspective was examined.  If 
the agent’s perspective was not calculated automatically but instead relies on executive 
processes, then inconsistent dual-task trials should result in a reduction of altercentric 
interference compared to inconsistent alone trials.  That is, participants would respond 
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faster in the dual-task inconsistent trials when self perspective was required because they 
no longer calculated the agent’s perspective.  In contrast, if the agent’s perspective was 
calculated automatically during inconsistent trials, then the secondary task should 
increase the altercentric interference.  In accord with Qureshi et al.’s findings, I expected 
the latter outcome.  In other words, dual-task trials should result in an increased 
altercentric effect for older adults, demonstrating that participants automatically calculate 
the agent’s perspective.  
In summary, my research questions and hypotheses are as follows:  
QI   Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual 
 perspective taking in an older adult sample?   
 
H1 Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone 
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when 
being asked to judge other perspective on the level-1 perspective taking 
task (i.e., indicating egocentric bias). 
 
H2 Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone 
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when 
being asked to judge self perspective on the level-1 perspective taking task 
(i.e., indicating altercentric bias). 
 
H3 In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in selection 
processes, the dual-task trials will result in larger processing costs in 
consistent and inconsistent trials with disproportionately larger costs in the 
inconsistent trials for older adults.   
 
H4  In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in   
  calculation processes, dual-task trials will result in a significantly larger  
  altercentric effect for older adults compared to alone trials.  If this result is 
  confirmed, then this would suggest that calculation of the other   
  perspective does not rely on executive function processes. 
 
Q2  In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory  
  contribute to theory of mind?  
 
H5  Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.  
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Q3  In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory  
  contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking? 
 
H6  Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared verbal working  
  memory.   
 
In the section that follows, the method for the current study is described including 
participants, sample size, instruments, and procedures.  Finally, the statistical analyses 
that were used to test the aforementioned hypotheses are described.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
The current study employs both experimental and correlational research designs.  
The population of interest is older adults with the goal of investigating performance on 
several tasks using a within subjects research design.  University of Northern Colorado’s 
(UNC) institutional review board (IRB) reviewed and approved this study (see Appendix 
A for approval letter).  The consent form can be seen in Appendices B.  Two amendments 
were made to the original IRB application.  The first amendment requested an extension 
of the sampling procedures to include an out-of-state sub-sample of participants.  The 
second amendment was for two changes in instruments.  These amendments were 
approved by the IRB (Appendix C).  
Participants 
Participants consisted of 42 older adults (23 female, 19 male) between the ages of 
60 and 87 (m = 68.25 years, sd = 5.40).  Male and female participants did not differ by 
age (t(41) = -1.259, p = .215).  See Table 2 for a break down of gender by five-year age 
ranges.  The sample was highly educated with a mean years of education of 16.18 (sd = 
3.10); however, males had significantly more years of education compared to females 
(t(41) = 2.06, p = .047, d = .64).  Seventy-four percent of the participants were retired and 
most of the participants were living with a significant other (79%).  See Table 3 for a 
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summary of age, gender, and education demographics.  Further details regarding the full 
sample are included in Appendix D (see Appendix E for the demographics form).  
 
Table 2 
Gender of Participants Broken into Five-year Increments  
 
Age 
 
Males  
N 
          Females  
              N 
Total  
N 
61-65 9                    6 15 
66-70 6                   10 16 
71-75 3                    4 7 
76-80 1                    2 3 
80+ 
 
                   1 1 
Total 19                   23 42 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
 
 Age, Gender, and Education for the Full Sample  
 
 N Mean SD 
Age    
Male 19 67.16 4.41 
Female 23 69.196 6.02 
Total 42 67.80 4.56 
Education*    
Male 17 17.24 3.46 
Female 21 15.27 2.51 
Total 39 16.13 3.08 
* Missing data for some participants on this demographic variable 
 
During the level-1 visual perspective taking dual task, one participant decided not 
to finish the testing block.  Another participant had an error rate ranging from 29 to 83 
percent incorrect responses on the dual task.  These two participants were dropped from 
the analysis involving the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  This resulted in a 
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sample size of 40 (21 females and 19 males) with a mean age of 67.66 (sd = 4.54) for the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that examined the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  
The current study included only aging in place participants.  Aging in place 
consists of individuals living in one’s own home during the aging process (McDonough 
& Davitt, 2011).  According to the 2001 United States Census, 95% of all individuals 65 
years and older are living in place.  In the current study, an aging in place sample was 
obtained with the goal of attaining a sample representative of the larger population.  
Sampling Procedures 
  Participants were recruited from two suburban regions: Colorado’s Front Range 
(N=28) and a city within an hour’s drive of Phoenix Arizona (N= 14).  Convenience 
sampling methods were employed including snowball sampling.  Approximately 120 
emails were sent, which yielded an approximate response rate of 8 percent.  The rest of 
the sample was obtained through word of mouth.  Recruiting procedures consisted of 
asking individuals if they were interested in volunteering an hour and half of their time.  
Participants were given a 10-dollar gift certificate as a token of appreciation.   
Measures 
Level-1 Perspective Taking   
A Dell laptop computer running Windows 7 and DMDX software (Forster & 
Forster, 2003) was used to present the stimuli for this task.  Response time data were also 
collected and recorded by DMDX.  It is important to note that there is a long history of 
using reaction time as a measure in aging samples (e.g., Galton, 1885; Koga & Morandt, 
1923).  While there are a variety of methods used to measure cognition, response time 
continues to be one of the most frequently used dependent variables in cognitive aging 
   
 
 
44 
studies.  Participants were seated at a table in their home where the laptop computer was 
set up.  The stimuli for this task can be viewed in Figure 2 and are based on Samson at al. 
(2010).1  After completing the consent process, both verbal and written instructions were 
provided to the participants (see Appendix F for written instructions).   
 
 
Figure. 2.  Illustration of the Conditions for the Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking Task 
Notes: This graphic was designed by Qureshi et al. The first frame indicates which 
perspective (i.e., self or other) participants responded to; the second frame indicates the 
number of dots participants verified; in the third frame participants made a response.  
                                                
1I am deeply grateful to Ian Apperly, Dana Samson, and Adam Qureshi who shared with 
me all the files for this task including, instructions, stimuli and the programming code.   
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Each trial consisted of three stimuli that were presented on a computer screen.  
First, participants were presented with the words “YOU” or “HE/SHE” (“HE” for male 
participants and “SHE” for female participants).  This first frame directed the participants 
to which perspective they were to respond to; “YOU” indicated to the participant to take 
their own perspective (i.e., self perspective) and “HE/SHE” indicated to the participant to 
take the agent’s perspective (i.e., other perspective).  In the second frame, the stimulus 
consisted of a number ranging from zero to three.  Lastly, the third stimulus contained the 
prompt from which the participant was to respond.  This final image per trial consisted of 
a picture of a room with the right, left, and back walls visible and varied by the number of 
red disks that were displayed on the walls.  Red disks were displayed either on both right 
and left walls or just one of the walls (i.e., right and/or left).  Some of the trials contained 
no red disks on the walls.  In addition to the variation of red disks, a computer-generated 
agent (male for male participants and female for female participants) was displayed in the 
center of the room and faced either right or left walls.  The participant’s task was to 
indicate with a mouse press whether or not the number shown in the second frame 
matched the number of disks either they could see or the agent could see.  That is, the 
participant’s task was to indicate if the number presented to them in the second stimuli 
(i.e., zero, one, two, or three) matched the number of red dots that either they could see 
(i.e., the self condition) or the number of red dots that the agent could see (i.e., the other 
condition) in the final scene.  A “yes” response was required when the picture matched 
the number of disks visible from the prompted perspective.  A “no” response was 
required when the picture did not match the number of disks visible from the prompted 
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perspective.  If no response was made after 4,000 ms, the trial timed out and the next trial 
began.  
In summary, there were four possible conditions.  In half the conditions 
participants were asked to judge their own perspective (self conditions; “YOU”) and in 
the other half, participants were asked to judge the agent’s perspective (other conditions; 
“HE/SHE”).  Additionally, in some conditions the participant saw the same number of 
disks as the agent (consistent condition), and in other conditions the participant saw a 
different number of disks compared to the agent (inconsistent condition).  That is, the 
consistency effect was testing for when the perspective of the participant was the same or 
different from the perspective of the agent.  These experimental conditions produced two 
independent variables each with two levels for this task.   Following the analyses 
conducted by Qureshi et al. (2010) processing costs were calculated, which were 
produced by dividing the reaction time by the proportion of correct responses for this task.  
In addition to processing costs, reaction time was also used as a dependent variable.  
Dual-task   
This task was modeled after the dual-task presented in Qureshi et al. (2010), 
which consisted of a level-1 perspective taking task with a secondary inhibition task (see 
below).  All aspects of the level-1 perspective taking task was identical to what was 
described above.  That is, the task contained four possible conditions: self, other, 
consistent, and inconsistent conditions.   
Secondary executive functioning task.  The secondary executive functioning 
task required inhibitory control and was developed based on the inhibition demands of 
Luria’s tapping task (Luria, 1966).  Luria’s tapping task consists of the presentation of 
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either one or two auditory tones.  Participants are asked to press a key either one or two 
times, in a pattern that is incongruent with number of tones that they heard.  In the current 
study, a variation of Luria’s tapping task was implemented for the purpose of not 
confounding the numerical components of the level-1 visual perspective taking task (i.e., 
number of red disks) with the numerical aspect of the Luria’s tapping task (i.e., number 
of tones).  The inhibition task for the current study consisted of an auditory presentation 
of the words “day” and “night” instead of tones.  Participants were asked to press either a 
picture of a moon or a picture of a sun on a computer mouse in a pattern that was 
incongruent with the words they heard.  That is, if they heard “day”, then they pressed the 
picture of a moon; if they heard “night”, then they pressed the picture of the moon.  A 
Macintosh laptop computer running OS X Lion and Superlab software (Cedrus, 2012) 
presented this task and recorded the response time data.   
The stimuli used for the day-night task in the current study were modeled after a 
task designed to measure inhibition of response conflict in children (Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994).  In the child version of the Day-Night task, participants were shown a 
set of pictures with two different stimuli and were instructed to say “day” when they were 
shown cards with pictures of a moon on a black background and to say “night” when they 
were shown pictures of a sun on a white background.  The version of the task used in the 
current study was chosen for the purpose of using auditory stimuli instead of visual 
stimuli.  
Theory of Mind Story Task   
A revised version of the Strange Story Task (SST, White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 
2009) was used as a measure of theory of mind.  The SST consists of short stories; half 
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the stories contain mental state reasoning and the other half do not require mental state 
reasoning, which consist of the control stories.  The theory of mind stories involves two 
characters in which one character has to make an inference regarding the other 
character’s mental state (e.g., white lie, irony, and persuasion).  The control stories 
contain information regarding a physical or mechanical outcome.   There were 10 items 
for each subscale (i.e., theory of mind stories and control stories) for a total of 20 items.  
Participants were asked to answer two questions pertaining to the vignette; in the mental 
state stories, participants were required to make inferences regarding the mental state of 
one of the characters in the story; in the control stories, participants were required to 
answer questions relating to the physical story.  Several studies (Castelli et al. 2010; 
Maylor et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) examining older adult theory of mind 
abilities have used variations of the SST.   
Each correctly answered question received two points and partially correct 
answers received one point.  This resulted with each item having a range of zero to two 
and the total maximum score for each subscale was 20.  Scoring required subjective 
evaluation of participant answers; thus, inter-reliability was conducted.  After two raters 
blindly scored the SST inter-rater was calculated; Cohen’s kappa was .76.  A third rater 
examined all discrepancies and made a decision regarding the score for each item until 
100 percent agreement was reached.  Previous research also reported Cohen’s kappa of 
.76 for the SST (Kaland et al., 2005). 
Working Memory 
  Although the structure of working memory demonstrates age invariance (Park et 
al., 2002), performance declines have been observed across the lifespan (e.g., Babcock & 
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Salthouse, 1990; Hale et al., 2011).  Specifically, evidence from cognitive aging studies 
suggests there are differential age-related declines for spatial versus verbal working 
memory (Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, & Hale, 2000; Hale et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
complex span tasks, which involve both storage and processing demands, demonstrate 
greater age-related decline compared to simple span tasks, which requires storage of 
information but not processing (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005).  Thus, I have chosen to 
measure both verbal and spatial working memory using complex span tasks described 
below. 
Verbal working memory. The Digit Span from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-IV (Wechsler, 2008) was used as a measure of verbal working memory.  The Digit 
Span is comprised of three subscales: forward, backward, and sequencing.  For the 
forward subscale, the researcher reads a series of numbers and the participant’s task is to 
recall the numbers in the same order.  For Digit Span backward, the participant’s task is 
to recall the numbers in reverse order; for sequencing, the participant is to recall the 
numbers in ascending order.  Each item consists of two trials that contain the same 
amount of numbers (e.g., item number one contains two trials each with two numbers and 
item number two contains two trials each with three numbers).  The subscale is 
discontinued if the participant receives a score of zero on two consecutive trials within 
the same item.  There are eight items per subscale with two trials per item.  Either one or 
zero points are awarded for correct and incorrect trials respectively.  The points are added 
to provide three subscale scores (with a maximum possible score of 16 points for each 
subscale) and a total score with a maximum possible score of 48.  Previous research has 
found test-retest reliability for Digit Span has been reported to be .83 (Wechsler, 1997).  
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Spatial working memory.  The Symbol Span subscale from the Wechsler’s 
Memory Scale-IV (WMS-IV, Wechsler, 2009) was used as an estimate of spatial working 
memory.  Symbol Span involves both storage and manipulation of visual details and has 
been designed to reduce verbal working memory and motor skills (Holdnack & Drozdick, 
2009).  The Symbol Span requires that participants visually examine shapes for 5 seconds 
from a flip chart held by the researcher.  Immediately following the presented shapes, 
several more shapes are shown to the participant, some of which were previously shown.  
The participant’s task is to indicate, in the correct order, which shapes they saw in the 
first set of stimuli (i.e., that were on the page from left to right).  The researcher records 
the participants’ exact responses and scores the task at a later time. 
Two points are awarded if the participant correctly identifies the shapes in the 
correct order.  One point is awarded if the participant correctly identifies the shapes but in 
the incorrect order.  If the participant does not accurately identify all shapes, then zero 
points are awarded for that item. The points are added to provide a total score for this 
measure.  If a participant scores a zero on four consecutive items, then the subscale is 
discontinued.  The total Symbol Span consists of 26 items with a total possible score of 
52.  Reliability coefficients for Symbol Span have been reported to range from .72 for 
test-retest and .76 to .92 for internal consistency (Holdnack & Drozdick, 2009).   
Demographics   
Using a self-report questionnaire, demographic information was collected to 
describe the sample characteristics of the groups (see Appendix E; size 14 MS reference 
sans serif font was used).  The demographic information consisted of age, gender, marital 
status, years of education, occupation, comfort with computers, perceived health status, 
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and level of physical activity.  To measure level of physical activity, I used item number 
five from the Physical Activity Scale for Elderly Adults (Washburn, Smith, Jette, & 
Janney, 1993; PASE).  This item asks participants “Over the past seven days, how often 
did you engage in strenuous sport and recreational activities such as jogging, cycling, 
swimming, singles tennis, aerobic dance, skiing, or other similar activities?”  Response 
choices included: never, seldom (1-2 days), sometimes (3-4 days), and often (5-7 days).  
Previous research with older adult participants found that this item differentiated between 
exercisers and non-exercisers (Kirkland, Karlin, Babkes Stellino, & Pulos, 2010).  
Procedures 
At the beginning of each data collection session, the purpose of the study was 
explained and the consent process was completed.  After the consent process, the 
computerized tasks were administered first, which included the level-1 visual perspective 
taking task conducted alone as well as the dual task version.  Verbal instructions were 
provided and participants read instructions where it was emphasized to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible.  Appendix F provides an example of the 
instructions (with the exception of the size and type of font; size 14 MS reference sans 
serif font was used).  Following procedures previously conducted, (Qureshi et al., 2010; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012), participants first completed practice blocks.  Participants 
completed 26 practice trials (Qureshi et al., 2010) of the level-1 perspective taking task, 
30 practice trials on the secondary inhibition task, and 52 practice trials of the dual-task 
(i.e., level-1 perspective taking and inhibition task).  The practice trials took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete.   
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The test blocks consisted of 52 trials of the level-1 perspective taking (without the 
dual-task) and 52 dual-task trials (level-1 perspective taking with inhibition task 
performed simultaneously), which took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  After a 
5-minute break the SST, digit span, and symbol span tasks were administered.  These 
final three tasks took between 40 and 60 minutes to complete and were counterbalanced 
across participants.  In sum, the data collection time with participants, including consent 
and debriefing procedures, took approximately 90 minutes to complete.  The following 
list represents a summary of the data collection procedure:  
(a) Consent process 
(b) Practice trials for level-1 perspective taking, inhibition task, and dual-task  
(c) One block of the level-1 perspective taking alone with 52 trials  
(d) One block of the dual-task condition with 52 trials  
(e) Strange story task  
(f) Digit span   
(g) Symbol span  
(h) Demographics 
(i) Debriefing 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22.  Preliminary data screening 
was conducted on all variables.  Descriptive statistics including means, standard 
deviations, and minimum and maximum scores for each of the continuous variables were 
obtained.  No errors were identified in the continuous variables.  The demographic data 
were examined through case summaries; three errors were identified and corrected.  
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Histograms were produced to examine the frequency distributions for the 
continuous variables of level-1 visual perspective taking, theory of mind stories, verbal 
and spatial working memory.  Consistent with reaction time data, the histograms showed 
strong positive skew for all variables included in the level-1 visual perspective taking 
task.  Normality was further assessed by producing skewness and kurtosis statistics as 
well as Shapiro-Wilk test of significance.  These distribution statistics were examined for 
each dependent variable (i.e., processing costs and reaction time) at each level of the 
independent variables for level-1 visual perspective taking.  Significant positive skew 
was present for both processing costs and reaction time variables.  A common method for 
reducing positive skew on reaction time variables is to calculate transformations on the 
skewed data (Osborne, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  Using this method, processing 
costs were transformed with the natural logarithm.  For reaction time, the presence of 
outliers contributed to non-normality; thus, the data were winsorized by the upper 95th 
percentile (Wilcox, 1997, 2005).  That is, all cases with scores above the 95th percentile 
were condensed down to the 95th percentile score.  See Appendix G for processing costs 
and reaction time distribution statistics before and after the data were winsorized.  
Scores for the theory of mind story task had negative skew.  Three participants 
with scores more that 2.5 standard deviations below the mean contributed to this negative 
skew.  The total subscale for verbal working memory (digit span forward, backward, and 
sequence) was normally distributed.  When examining the verbal working memory 
subscales separately, digit span forward and backward had small deviations in normality.  
Verbal working memory as measured by digit span sequence was normally distributed.  
Spatial working memory as measured by symbol span was normally distributed.  
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Appendix H provides the distribution statistics for the theory of mind story task and 
verbal and spatial working memory.  The following three sections reports the data 
analyses conducted for each of the research questions.   
Examining Cognitive Efficiency  
The first research question was, “Is there evidence of cognitively efficient 
processes in level-1 visual perspective taking in an older adult sample?”  Two repeated 
measures analysis of variances (ANOVA) were conducted to test the first four hypotheses 
associated with this question (one with processing costs and one with reaction time as the 
dependent variable).  As stated above, processing costs and reaction time distributions 
showed significant positive skew.  To adjust for the non-normal distributions, processing 
costs were transformed by the natural log and reaction time variables were winsorized.  
Thus, the first ANOVA was conducted with a natural log transformation of processing 
costs as the dependent variable.  The second ANOVA was conducted with reaction time 
winsorized as the dependent variable.   
  It is important to note that even though between and within person variance is 
greater in older compared to young adults (Hulsch, MacDonald, & Dixon, 2002), reaction 
time measures have been used successfully to estimate a wide-range of cognitive 
processes during the aging process.  In the current study, the research questions and 
corresponding analyses with processing costs and reaction time as the dependent 
measures are investigated by a within subject design.  Therefore, the repeated measure 
design accounts for individual differences in speed and manual dexterity.  
The data analysis was modeled based on Qureshi et al.’s (2010) study.  Only “yes” 
trials were analyzed because of the unbalanced number of answers of “yes” compared to 
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“no” trials.  That is, due to the configuration of the dots, there were less mismatched “no” 
trials compared to matched “yes” trials.  For both the alone and dual-task versions of the 
level-1 visual perspective taking, processing costs and reaction times were utilized as the 
dependent variables, which were calculated for each individual by condition.  As 
previously discussed, the nature log transformation was conducted on processing costs 
and the reaction time data were winsorized by the top 95th percentile.  
The factors that repeated for level-1 visual perspective taking were consistency 
(consistent versus inconsistent), perspective (self versus other), and task (alone versus 
dual).  The consistency factor compared conditions when the perspective of the 
participant was either the same or different from the perspective of the agent.  The 
perspective factor compared conditions when the participant was asked to take their own 
perspective (i.e., self) versus conditions where they were asked to take the agent’s 
perspective (i.e., other).  The level-1 perspective taking alone compared to the dual-task 
condition tested for a task effect.  In total, the following conditions were entered into the 
ANOVA: a) Alone Other consistent; b) Alone Other Inconsistent; c) Alone Self 
Consistent; d) Alone Self Inconsistent; e) Dual Other consistent; f) Dual Other 
Inconsistent; g) Dual Self Consistent; and h) Dual Self Inconsistent.   
Based on a power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), a sample size of 38 was determined as necessary for 
a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with partial eta squared set at .33, alpha set at .05, 
and power set at .95.  Table 4 provides a summary of the predicted outcomes for the 
ANOVA based on the hypotheses for the current study.   
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Table 4 
 
Predicted Outcomes Based on a Repeated Measures ANOVA 
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis would be 
confirmed with the 
following results 
Description 
Older adults will perform 
significantly slower and/or more 
error prone when their 
perspective differs from that of 
the avatars perspective when 
being asked to judge other 
perspective on the level-1 
perspective taking task (i.e., 
indicating egocentric bias) 
  
Consistency effect  
 
(inconsistent > 
consistent  
for other perspective) 
 
Participants show higher 
processing costs (i.e., 
are slower) on 
inconsistent compared 
to consistent trials when 
being asked to judge the 
agent’s perspective  
Older adults will perform 
significantly slower and/or more 
error prone when their 
perspective differs from that of 
the avatars perspective when 
being asked to judge self 
perspective on the level-1 
perspective taking task (i.e., 
indicating altercentric bias) 
  
Consistency effect  
 
(inconsistent > 
consistent  
for self perspective) 
 
Participants show higher 
processing costs (i.e., 
are slower) on 
inconsistent compared 
to consistent trials when 
being asked to judge 
their own perspective 
In regards to examining whether 
executive function is involved in 
selection processes, the dual-task 
trials will result in larger 
processing costs in consistent 
and inconsistent trials with 
disproportionately larger costs in 
the inconsistent trials for older 
adults 
  
Interaction effect of: 
Task x Consistency 
 
(dual-task > alone  
for both inconsistent 
and consistent trials but 
sig. larger for 
inconsistent) 
 
Participants show higher 
processing costs (i.e., 
are slower) on dual-task 
compared to alone trials 
for both consistent and 
inconsistent trials with 
significantly larger costs 
for the inconsistent trials 
In regards to examining whether 
executive function is involved in 
calculation processes, dual-task 
trials will result in a significantly 
larger altercentric effect (i.e., 
slower RT’s for inconsistent self 
trials) for older adults compared 
to alone trials 
Interaction effect of: 
Consistency x Task  
 
(inconsistent > 
consistent for both 
dual-task and alone 
trials but sig. larger for 
dual condition) 
Participants show a 
significantly larger 
altercentric interference 
effect (i.e.,inconsistent > 
consistent for self-
perspective trials) for 
dual-task compared to 
alone trials  
   
 
 
57 
Prior to analysis, the assumptions for a repeated measures ANOVA were 
examined, which include normality and sphericity.  As characteristic of reaction time 
data, the first assumption was violated due to the presence of significant positive skew. 
To adjust for the non-normal distributions, transformations were conducted on the data; 
processing costs were transformed by the natural log and reaction time data were 
winsorized (see Appendix G for distribution statistics before and after transformations).  
The second assumption for a repeated measures ANOVA is sphericity (Huynh & Feldt, 
1970).  Sphericity is similar to the assumption of homogeneity of variances that is 
necessary for a between-subject ANOVA; however, sphericity requires that the 
differences in variance between each level of the independent variables are equal (i.e., the 
covariances between each level are equal, Field, 1988).  In the case of the current study, 
sphericity was satisfied since there were only two levels for each independent variable.  
That is, the assumption of sphericity was met since level-1 visual perspective taking task 
included only one covariance for each repeated measure.   
Finally, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with the same three 
factors (i.e., consistency, perspective and task) as the repeated measures and a between-
subject factor of gender (male versus female).  Assumptions for a mixed-design ANOVA 
include independence of observations, normal distributions, and homogeneity of variance.  
The first assumption, independence of observations, is required for the between-subject 
factor, which in this case is gender.   The assumption of independence of observations 
involves how the sample is obtained (Howell, 2007).  There should be no dependency 
between participants, which requires that the participants are randomly selected from the 
population.  Nonrandom sampling methods were employed in the current study, thus the 
   
 
 
58 
first assumption was violated; however, participants were recruited from two states in 
several different counties with the goal of obtaining a sample that would increase the 
likelihood of independence of observations between participants.   
To appropriately interpret an F test statistic, in addition to the assumption of 
normality, a mixed-design ANOVA requires the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  
Levene’s test of equal error variances was examined for each of the eight variables.  One 
variable had a significant p-value (Self Inconsistent trials on the Alone task), indicating 
homogeneity of variance was violated for that variable (F(1, 36) = 8.023, p = .007); 
however, when sample sizes are balanced, ANOVA is relatively robust against violations 
of equal variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  All other variables were non-significant 
indicating these variables had equal error variances (see Appendix I for the Levene 
statistics).  Lastly, Box’s (1954) test of equal covariance was non-significant (F(1,36) = 
1.212, p = 1.80), also indicating that the assumption of equal covariance was satisfied.   
Theory of mind and Working  
Memory 
 
The second research question was, “In an older adult sample, how does verbal and 
spatial working memory contribute to theory of mind?”  To test my hypothesis that verbal 
working memory makes a stronger contribution compared to spatial working memory on 
theory of mind performance, verbal working memory was added in the first step.  After 
verbal working memory was added to the regression, spatial working memory was added 
in the second step.  The hierarchical regression was conducted using listwise deletion.  In 
addition to examining the R2 for each predictor variable (i.e., spatial and verbal working 
memory), the R2 change and the p-value associated with the F-change was examined.  
The R2 change and the F-change examines the amount of additional variance explained 
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by the second predictor added to the model, which in this case was spatial working 
memory.  Using G*Power 3.1 software, a sample size of 42 was determined as necessary 
for a regression with two predictor variables, alpha set at .05, power set at .95, and a 
partial R squared set to .25 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
Prior to conducting the aforementioned regression analysis, the assumptions of 
linearity, homoscedasticity (i.e., equal variance of the residuals), and normality (i.e., the 
error distributions should be normally distributed) were assessed.  Scatterplots were 
produced to examine linearity between the outcome variable (theory of mind stories) and 
the predictor variables (verbal working memory, and spatial working memory).  The two 
scatterplots indicated adequate linearity.  To assess normality of residuals (residuals 
should be normally distributed around zero), probability-probability plots (P-P plots) 
were examined for each of the variables (theory of mind stories, verbal and spatial 
working memory).  The P-P plots demonstrated that the residuals were approximately 
normally distributed and therefore was adequately met.  
Finally, multicollinearity (i.e., where correlations among two or more variables 
have almost perfect linear relationships, Mason & Perreault, 1991) in the predictor 
variables was examined through checking the variance inflation factors (VIF’s); VIF’s 
above ten (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005) or in some cases five (O'Brien, 2007) are highly 
correlated.  For the current study, the VIF’s were 1.122, indicating this assumption was 
adequately met. 
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking  
and Working Memory 
 
My third research question was, “In an older adult sample, how does verbal and 
spatial working memory contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking?”  Two 
   
 
 
60 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to answer this research question.  The 
first examined the impact of verbal and spatial working memory on the level-1 visual 
perspective taking task alone.  The second examined the impact of verbal and spatial 
working memory on the dual-task version.  Thus, the two hierarchical regression analyses 
used different outcome variables with the same predictor variables.  To test my 
hypothesis that spatial working memory makes a stronger contribution compared to 
verbal working memory on level-1 visual perspective taking performance, spatial 
working memory was added in the first step.  Next, verbal working memory was added to 
the model in the second step (i.e., after verbal working memory).  Listwise deletion was 
used while carrying out the regression.  In addition to examining the R2 for each predictor 
variable (i.e., spatial and verbal working memory), R2-change and the corresponding p-
value associated with the F-change was examined for verbal working memory, which 
was added in the second step. 
The same assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity (i.e., equal 
variance of the residuals) that were examined for the previous hierarchical regression 
were also examined prior to this second regression analysis.  Since the predictor variables 
are the same for both regressions, only the assumptions specific to level-1 visual 
perspective taking task needed to be examined.  
Four scatter plots examined the assumption of linearity; first, with level-1 visual 
perspective taking alone on the y-axis and verbal working memory (i.e., digit span 
sequence) on the x-axis; and second, with level-1 visual perspective taking alone on the 
y-axis and spatial working memory on the x-axis.  The last two scatter plots examined the 
dual-task version of level-1 visual perspective taking on the y-axis and each of the 
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working memory measures on the x-axis.  The scatterplots demonstrated that the 
assumption of linearity was met.  Residual values for level-1 visual perspective taking 
were examined with P-P plots.  All level-1 visual perspective taking variables showed 
adequate normality of the residuals (i.e., residuals were approximately equally distributed 
around zero). 
Demographics   
Data collected from the self-report demographics survey have been used to 
describe the sample.  Descriptive statistics were calculated for the two continuous 
variables of age and education.  Frequency distributions were examined for all 
categorical demographic variables including, marital status, retirement (i.e., yes or no), 
exercise, health, familiarity with computers, part-time or full-time work, and finally 
volunteering and homemaker status (i.e., yes or no).  See appendix D for demographic 
characteristics of the sample. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 The results are organized into three broad sections based on their corresponding 
research questions.  First, the results for the repeated measures ANOVA are presented, 
which corresponds to the first research question.  The second and third sections report the 
results for the hierarchical regression, which corresponds to the second and third research 
questions.  The statistical assumptions were presented in the previous chapter in the data 
analyses sections.  All assumptions for a repeated measures ANOVA were adequately 
met.  To address the positive skew that is characteristic of reaction time data, 
transformations on the level-1 visual perspective taking variables were conducted.  Prior 
to reporting the results for the first research question, the variables are reviewed and brief 
summaries of the hypotheses are provided.  
Is there Evidence of Cognitively Efficient Processes in  
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking in an  
Older Adult Sample? 
 
To review, the level-1 visual perspective taking task includes three independent 
variables: perspective (self vs. other), consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent), and task 
(alone vs. dual).  The results reported in the current section pertains to the first four 
hypotheses testing for egocentric and altercentric interference effects as well as the role 
of executive functioning during level-1 visual perspective taking.  The first hypothesis 
tested if older adults are prone to egocentric interference.  Egocentric interference 
   
 
 
63 
corresponds to slower reaction times for inconsistent compared to consistent trials when 
being asked to judge the agent’s perspective (i.e., Other condition).  The second 
hypothesis tested if older adults demonstrate altercentric interference.  Altercentric 
interference corresponds to slower reaction times for inconsistent compared to consistent 
trials when being asked to judge owns own perspective (i.e., Self condition).  To be clear, 
if processing costs are larger for inconsistent compared to consistent trials when 
participants make judgments for the other perspective, then this corresponds to egocentric 
interference.  If processing costs are larger for inconsistent compared to consistent trials 
when participants respond to their own perspective (i.e., self perspective), then this 
corresponds to altercentric inference effects. 
The effect of the dual task on level-1 visual perspective taking tests for the third 
and forth hypotheses regarding the role of executive functioning in level-1 visual 
perspective taking.  Two sets of analysis are reported in the following section: a) 
processing costs as the dependent variable, and b) reaction time as the dependent variable.  
Processing costs were calculated for each participant by dividing reaction time by the 
proportion of correct response in each condition; hence, smaller processing costs are an 
indication of better performance (i.e., quick response time and high accuracy).  
Processing Costs   
Descriptive statistics for the initial processing costs (without transformations) are 
presented in Table 5 (see Appendix J for descriptive statistics with the natural log 
transformation).  A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA conducted with the natural log 
transformation as the dependent variable revealed two main effects and two significant 
interactions.  There was a main effect of consistency (Inconsistent > Consistent; F(1, 39)  = 
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64.243, p < .000, ηp2 = .622).  The consistency effect tested for the difference in 
conditions when the participant’s and the agent’s perspectives match (i.e., Consistent) 
compared to when the perspectives do not match (i.e., Inconsistent).  There was a main 
effect for task condition (Dual > Alone; F(1, 39) = 4.713, p = .036, ηp2 = .108).  The 
analysis did not reveal a main effect for perspective (F(1, 39) = 3.079, p = .087, ηp2 = .073).  
Significant interactions were found between task and perspective (F(1, 39) = 6.855, p 
= .013, ηp2 = .149) and between perspective and consistency (F(1, 39) = 8.479, p = .006, ηp2 
= .179).  No significant interaction was found between task and consistency (F(1, 39) 
= .447, p = .508, ηp2 = .011).  See Figure 3 for processing costs by each condition.  
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP: Processing Costs without Transformations  
 
  
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Alone      
 Other Consistent 40 969.45 226.00 661.00 1553.00 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1358.30 650.35 616.00 4183.18 
 Self Consistent 40 975.82 283.47 608.00 1882.00 
 Self Inconsistent 40 1118.52 491.35 647.00 2820.36 
Dual      
 Other Consistent 40 1063.54 509.57 548.00 3333.33 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1364.98 582.32 483.00 3137.93 
 Self Consistent 40 1164.13 485.04 639.00 3196.15 
 Self Inconsistent 40 1257.77 502.73 664.00 4519.52 
Note.  L-1VP = level-1 visual perspective taking 
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Figure. 3. Processing Costs for each Condition 
Notes: The error bars are confidence intervals (CI) calculated with the Loftus and Masson 
(1994) formula in the natural log form (CI, ±.00126) then transformed back to reaction 
time units by calculating the antilog after the analysis.  The curved brackets show the 
egocentric interference, which is indicated by the faster Consistent compared to 
Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective.  
 
 
Post hoc analysis examined the interaction between task and perspective, which 
revealed one significant contrast.  The Self perspective was significantly faster for the 
Alone (self alone = 989.30 ms) compared to the Dual task (self dual = 1137.97 ms) 
condition.  That is, a task effect was found only when participants judged their own 
perspective.  See figure 4 for an illustration of the interaction.  Table 6 reports the 
pairwise contrasts, which includes confidence intervals derived by the Loftus and Masson 
(1994) method for repeated measures ANOVA’s (95% CI = ± .058971). 
 
   
 
 
66 
Figure. 4. Line Graph of Task by Perspective Interaction for Processing Costs 
Notes: A significant contrast was found between Alone and Dual task conditions for Self 
perspective. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Task by Perspective Interaction with Processing Costs as the Dependent Variable  
 
  95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Condition Mean               Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Alone    
    Other 1082.69           1020.48 1148.22 
    Self  989.30          932.65 1049.40 
Dual    
    Other 1117.69           1053.66 1185.56 
    Self 1137.97           1072.80 1207.09 
Note.  CI’s derived from the Loftus and Masson (1994) formula in the natural log (CI ±. 
.058971) then transformed using the antilog.  The significant contrast was between the 
Alone and Dual task conditions for the Self perspective (note the non-overlapping CI’s). 
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Post hoc analysis examined the interaction between consistency and perspective. 
One significant contrast was found.  A significant consistency effect (inconsistent > 
consistent) was found for Other but not for Self perspective.  That is, for the Other 
perspective (i.e., when participants were asked to judge the avatar’s perspective) 
participants were significantly slower for the Inconsistent conditions (i.e., when the 
perspectives did not match, inconsistent = 1262.69 ms) compared to the Consistent 
conditions (i.e., when the perspectives matched, consistent = 958.15 ms).  Whereas, there 
was no difference between consistency conditions for the Self perspective (i.e., when 
participants were asked to judge their own perspective).   See Figure 5 for the line plot 
and Table 7 for the means and confidence intervals for this pairwise contrast. 
 
 
Figure. 5. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Processing Costs  
Notes: The significant contrast was between the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions 
for the Other perspective.  
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Table 7 
 
Perspective by Consistency Interaction with Processing Costs as the Dependent Variable 
 
  95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Condition Mean            Lower Bound   Upper Bound 
Other    
     Consistent 958.15            874.30 1050.04 
     Inconsistent  1262.69             1152.19 1383.79 
 
Self    
     Consistent 1015.36            926.50 1112.74 
     Inconsistent 1109.87             1012.74 1216.31 
    
Note.  The Loftus and Masson (1994) formula was used to calculate the CI (± .091581), 
followed by an antilog calculation.  The only contrast with non-overlapping confidence 
intervals (i.e. indicating a significant effect) was between other Consistent and other 
Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective. 
 
 
Reaction Time   
Descriptive statistics for reaction time after the variables were winsorized are 
displayed in Table 8 (see Appendix K for descriptive statistics for reaction time before 
the variables were winsorized).  The ANOVA with reaction time as the dependent 
variable revealed the same main effects and interactions as the processing costs analysis.  
A main effect of consistency was found (F(1, 39) = 53.251, p < .000, ηp2 = .577 ) with 
consistent conditions (m = 956.67 ms) significantly faster than inconsistent conditions (m 
= 1058.63 ms).  A main effect of task (F(1, 39) = 4.350, p = .044, ηp2 = .100) revealed that 
the alone conditions (m = 974.78 ms) were significantly faster than dual task conditions 
(m = 1040.53 ms).  No significant perspective effect was found (F(1,41) = .043, p < .837, 
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ηp2 = .001).  Two significant interactions were found; task by perspective (F(1, 39) = 7.114, 
p = .011, ηp2 = .154) and perspective by consistency (F(1, 39) = 15.908, p < .000, ηp2 
= .290).  Thus, before interpreting the main effects, the interactions were examined 
further.  No significant interaction was found between task and consistency (F(1, 39) = 
2.662, p = .111, ηp2 = .064).  See Figure 6 for results by each level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP task: Reaction Times after data were Winsorized  
 
  
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Alone      
 Other Consistent 40 891.95 192.85 587.00 1303.90 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1105.05 286.26 497.00 1786.40 
 Self Consistent 40 927.58 230.36 490.00 1368.10 
 Self Inconsistent 40 974.52 308.58 471.00 1682.40 
Dual      
 Other Consistent 40 953.29 296.57 548.00 1710.30 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1087.73 290.77 483.00 1825.00 
 Self Consistent 40 1053.88 309.58 639.00 1815.50 
 Self Inconsistent 40 1067.24 251.54 664.00 1600.70 
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Figure. 6.  Reaction time for each condition.  The error bars are confidence intervals 
calculated with the Loftus and Masson (1994) formula (CI, ± 42.723).  The curved 
brackets show the egocentric interference, which is indicated by the faster reaction times 
for the Consistent compared to the Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective.  
 
 
 
The interaction between task and perspective was examined further with a post 
hoc pairwise contrast.  The Self perspective was significantly faster for the Alone (m = 
951.05 ms) compared to the Dual task condition (m = 1060.56 ms).  No other pairwise 
contrasts were significant.  See Figure 7 for an illustration of the interaction.  Table 9 
provides descriptive statistics and confidence intervals for this contrast. 
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Figure. 7.  Line graph of task by perspective interaction for reaction time. A significant 
contrast was found between Alone and Dual task conditions for Self perspective. 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Task by Perspective Interaction with Reaction Time as the Dependent Variable  
   95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Alone     
     Other 998.50 36.22 951.58 1045.41 
     Self  951.05 41.14 904.13 997.97 
 
Dual     
     Other 1020.51 42.89 973.59 1067.42 
     Self 1060.56 40.07 1013.64 1107.47 
Note.  Loftus and Masson (1994) formula used to calculate the CI’s (± 42.723).  The only 
significant contrast is between the alone and dual task condition for self perspective.  
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The pairwise post hoc comparison between consistency and perspective revealed 
a significant consistency effect for Other perspective (consistent = 922.62 ms; 
inconsistent = 1096.34 ms) but not for Self perspective (Figure 8).  That is, when 
participants responded to conditions being asked to judge the Other perspective (i.e., the 
agent’s perspective), they were significantly faster on Consistent conditions (i.e., when 
the participant’s and agent’s perspectives matched, m= 958.15 ms) compared to 
Inconsistent conditions (i.e., when the participant’s and agent’s perspective did not match, 
m= 1262.69 ms).  There was no consistent effect for the self perspective conditions.  
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics and confidence intervals for these pairwise 
contrasts.  
 
 
Table 10  
 
Perspective by Consistency Interaction with Reaction Time as the Dependent Variable 
   95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
 
Condition Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Other     
     Consistent 922.62 31.98 857.93 987.30 
     Inconsistent  1096.39 39.77 1015.94 1176.83 
 
Self     
     Consistent 990.73 40.04 909.74 1071.71 
     Inconsistent 1020.88 38.72 942.57 1099.19 
Note.  Loftus and Masson (1994) CI ± 51.499.  The only significant pairwise contrast for 
between consistent and inconsistent for the other perspective. 
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Figure. 8.  Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Reaction Time 
Notes: The significant contrast was between the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions 
for the Other perspective. 
 
 
Predicted versus Measured  
Reaction Time   
 
Researchers have developed algebraic functions to estimate older adult reaction 
time based on young adult data.  To consider how the results of the current sample 
compare to predicted reaction times based on such functions, young adult reaction times 
from a previous study (Qureshi, 2008) utilizing a similar level-1 visual perspective taking 
task was entered into a formula as described by Verhaeghen (2006).  In consideration of 
the task demands of level-1 visual perspective taking, a formula for spatial stimuli was 
employed.  See Table 11 for predicted reaction times for older adults based on a young 
adult sample as well as the actual reaction times demonstrated by the current older adult 
sample.  
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Table 11 
Predicted Older Adult Reaction Time versus Data Collected in the Current Sample 
  
Young 
adults 
 
Predicted 
older adults 
 
Current 
sample 
Alone    
   Other consistent 595 920 970 
   Other inconsistent 780 1290 1360 
   Self consistent 620 970 975 
   Self inconsistent 770 1270 1120 
Dual    
   Other consistent 775 1280 1060 
   Other inconsistent 1450 2630 1360 
   Self consistent 775 1280 1160 
   Self inconsistent 1200 2130 1260 
Note.  The young adult reaction times were from Qureshi (2008). The predicted reaction 
times were based on Verhaeghen’s (2006) formula for spatial tasks: older adult reaction 
times = 2*young adult reaction times-270.  
 
Gender Analysis 
 Using reaction time as the dependent variable, the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design 
ANOVA with consistency (consistent versus inconsistent), perspective (self versus other), 
and task (alone versus dual) as the within subject factors and gender (male versus female) 
as the between-subject factor revealed an overall gender effect (F(1, 38) = 5.495, p = .024, 
d = .73).  Males were significantly faster (m = 926.24 ms, SE = 47.931) than females (m 
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= 1081.31 ms, SE = 45.591).  No significant gender interactions were found.  The mixed-
design ANOVA using processing cost as the dependent variable did not reveal any 
significant gender effects.  That is, in contrast to the reaction time analysis, processing 
cost did not reveal an overall gender effect (F(1, 38) = 1.962, p = .169). 
In an Older Adult Sample, how does Spatial and Verbal  
Working Memory Contribute to Theory of Mind? 
 
Prior to reporting the results of the hierarchical regression analyses, a description 
of the theory of mind story task and the measures of working memory follows.  The 
theory of mind story task had a mean of 15.48 (out of a 20 points possible) with a 
standard deviation of 2.54.  There were three outliers with low scores that were 
disconnected from the rest of the distribution.  All analyses were conducted with the full 
sample; however, I examined the mean and standard deviation of the theory of mind story 
task with these three outliers dropped to examine central tendency and spread for the 
majority of the sample.  The mean and standard deviation with the three outliers dropped 
were 16.03 and 1.75 respectively, indicating that the variance for the majority of the 
distribution was small.  The current sample means and standard deviation for the digit 
span forward, backward, and sequence were 10.21 (2.28), 8.48 (1.85), and 8.86 (1.83) 
respectively.  The mean of the total digit span was 27.55 with a standard deviation of 
4.91.  The mean symbol span score for current study was 21.52 with a standard deviation 
of 5.51.  See Table 12 for a summary of descriptive statistics for the theory of mind story 
task and the working memory measures.   
A hierarchical regression analysis examined if spatial working memory explained 
variance in the theory of mind story task above and beyond verbal working memory.  
Verbal working memory was added in the first step, which produced a significant model 
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(F(1, 40) = 5.867, p = .02, R2 = .128).  At the second step spatial working memory was 
added, which produced an overall statistically significantly model, F(2, 39) = 3.539, p 
= .039.  The R2 change after adding spatial working memory was .026, which was not 
statistically significant (F change = 1.184, p = .283), providing an overall R2 of .154.  
 
 
Table 12 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Theory of Mind Task and Working Memory Measures 
  
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
      
SST      
   Theory of mind 42 15.48 2.54 8 20 
   Control stories  42 16.3 2.56 11 20 
Digit span total 42 27.55 4.91 18 40 
   Digit span forward 42 10.21 2.28 6 16 
   Digit span backward 42 8.48 1.85 5 14 
   Digit span sequence 42 8.86 1.83 5 12 
Symbol span 42 21.52 5.51 9 33 
Note.  SST = Strange stories Task, which includes theory of mind stories and control 
stories; SD = standard deviation; Digit span is a measure of verbal working memory from 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV and symbol span is a measure of visual 
working memory from the Wechsler Memory Scale-IV. 
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In an Older Adult Sample, how does Spatial and Verbal 
Working Memory Contribute to Level-1  
Visual Perspective Taking? 
 
Two hierarchical regression analyses examined if verbal working memory 
explained variance in the level-1 visual perspective taking task above and beyond spatial 
working memory.  For the first regression, processing costs for the alone task was entered 
as the outcome variable.  The first step in the analysis revealed that spatial working 
memory (as measured by Digit Span total) did not contribute significantly to the model, 
F(1, 39) = 3.47, p = .07.  At the second step verbal working memory was added, which did 
not contribute to the model significantly (F(2, 38) = 1.843, p = .172).  The R2 change after 
adding verbal working memory was not significant (R2 change .088, F change = .284, p 
= .597) giving an overall R2 of .088. 
For the second regression, processing costs for the dual task was entered as the 
outcome variable.  Spatial working memory was again entered in the first step, F(1, 39) = 
2.064, p = .159).  Verbal working memory was added in the second step, which did not 
contribute to the model significantly (F(2, 39) = 1.631, p = .209).  The R2 change after 
adding verbal working memory was not significant (R2 change = .029, F change = 1.188, 
p = .283) providing an overall R2 of .079. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The current study investigated mental state understanding during aging with two 
primary goals.  First, I set out to examine if there is evidence of automatic and 
cognitively efficient processes involved in mental state understanding in an older adult 
sample.  My second goal was to investigate how verbal and spatial working memory 
mediates performance in mental state understanding in older adults.  An aging in place 
sample was obtained with the goal of increasing the generalizability of the findings to the 
larger population of older adults (Black, 2008).  The first section of the current chapter 
begins with a discussion of the results in context with my first research question.  The 
second section of the current chapter presents the results associated with my second and 
third research questions followed by a discussion of the conclusions and implications of 
results in context of the broader literature.  Finally, I finish with suggestions for future 
research and discuss the limitations of the current study.  Prior to discussing the results, 
the following is a summary of my three research questions and the associated hypotheses.   
Q1  Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in a level-1 visual 
  perspective taking task in an older adult sample?   
 
H1 Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone 
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when 
being asked to judge other perspective on the level-1 perspective taking 
task (i.e., indicating egocentric bias). 
 
H2 Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone 
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when 
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being asked to judge self perspective on the level-1 perspective taking task 
(i.e., indicating altercentric bias). 
 
H3 In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in selection 
processes, the dual-task trials will result in larger processing costs in 
consistent and inconsistent trials with disproportionately larger costs in the 
inconsistent trials for older adults.   
 
H4  In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in   
  calculation processes, dual-task trials will result in a significantly larger  
  altercentric effect for older adults compared to alone trials.  If this result is 
  confirmed, then this would suggest that calculation of the other   
  perspective does not rely on executive function processes. 
 
Q2  In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory  
  contribute to theory of mind?  
 
H5  Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.  
 
Q3  In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory  
  contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking? 
 
H6  Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared to verbal working  
  memory.   
 
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking 
  
The first research question was, “Is there evidence of cognitively efficient 
processes in a level-1 visual perspective taking task in an older adult sample?”  
Answering this question will be accomplished by considering the entire set of results for 
the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  Thus, the results testing each of my first four 
hypotheses are considered individually.  The current study used a level-1 visual 
perspective taking task where participants made either self or other judgments regarding 
the number of red dots that were visible on the computer screen.  In some conditions, the 
perspective of the participant and the perspective of the agent (i.e., a computer generated 
avatar) did not match; these were inconsistent trials.  In other conditions, the perspective 
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of the participant and the agent did match; these were consistent trials.  Thus, a 
consistency effect tested the difference between inconsistent and consistent perspectives 
(i.e., mismatched versus matched respectively).  A perspective effect was tested by 
comparing the self and other perspectives.  Finally, participants completed the level-1 
visual perspective taking task alone and as a dual task with a secondary inhibition task.  
The difference between the alone and dual task conditions tested for a task effect.  The 
purpose of including the dual task was to examine the impact of inhibition demands on 
level-1 visual perspective taking.  The critical prediction for the dual task was a 
hypothesized interaction between task and consistency such that the dual task would 
result in a significantly larger consistency effect compared to the alone task.  This 
interaction would suggest that inhibitory aspects of executive functioning is not involved 
when older adults calculate the agent’s perspective; thus, providing evidence of 
cognitively efficient processes in mental state understanding during aging.  
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of consistency, however, a significant 
interaction between consistency and perspective was found; thus, follow-up analysis was 
necessary before the consistency effect could be interpreted.  A pairwise contrast 
indicated that the consistency effect was significant when participants judged the agent’s 
perspective (i.e., other condition) but no consistency effect was found when participants 
judged their own perspective (i.e., self conditions).  Thus, the first hypothesis examining 
if older adults are prone to egocentric bias was supported.  That is, when participants 
were asked to judge the perspective of the agent, they were significantly slower when 
their own perspective did not match (i.e., inconsistent) compared to when their 
perspective did match the agent’s perspective (i.e., consistent).  Analysis using 
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processing costs (i.e., reaction time divided by the proportion of correct responses), as 
well as reaction time alone, resulted in the same outcome.  To reiterate, these results 
indicate that older adults are prone to egocentric interference as indicated by the 
significantly larger processing costs and slower reaction time for inconsistent compared 
to consistent trials for other perspective.  
The second hypothesis examined if there was evidence of altercentric interference 
effects in an older adult sample.  As stated above, the follow-up analysis examining the 
interaction between consistency and perspective indicated that there was no consistency 
effect for self trials.  This is to say, when participants judged their own perspective there 
were no statistically significant interference effects (i.e., difference between inconsistent 
and consistent conditions) when the agents’ perspective differed from their own. 
In regards to examining if inhibitory control is involved in selection processes 
(i.e., when participants make a response selection), I predicted that dual-task trials would 
result in larger processing costs (i.e., slower reaction times and higher error rates) for 
both consistent and inconsistent conditions with disproportionately larger costs in the 
inconsistent trials.  This hypothesis would have been supported by a significant task by 
consistency interaction; however, this hypothesis was not supported in the current study. 
I hypothesized that dual-task trials would result in larger altercentric interference effects 
compared to the alone trials; however, no altercentric effects were found in either alone 
or dual-task conditions.  Thus, the forth hypothesis was not supported.   
Finally, a significant interaction between task and perspective was found.  No a 
priori hypothesis for made for this interaction.  Follow-up analysis indicated that the self 
perspective was significantly slower for the dual task compared to the alone task; 
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whereas, no significant difference was found for the other perspective.  In other words, 
when participants judged their own perspective they were significantly slower and more 
error prone in the dual-task trials compared to the alone trials. There were no theoretical 
reasons to predict a significant task by perspective interaction.     
Egocentric Interference 
The significant consistency effect when participants judged the agent’s 
perspective (i.e., Other perspective) provides evidence that older adults are prone to 
egocentric interference.  Egocentric bias, that is, bias due to self-knowledge interfering 
with the accurate assessment of another individual or perspective, have been observed 
from the earliest stages of development (Bjorklund & Green, 1992; Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956).  For example, 14 month olds responded egocentrically 
when infants watched an experimenter either express enjoyment or disgust after taking a 
food; instead of predicting which food the experimenter would prefer (based on the 
enjoyment or disgust reactions of the experimenter), the 14 old month infants responded 
egocentrically (that is, based on their own preferences, Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).  
In the preschool years, errors that children make in false belief tasks tend to be 
systematic egocentric errors (e.g., Doherty & Wimmer, 2005).  In a false belief task 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), children see a character, Sally, place an object in a round box 
and then leave the room.  A different character, Ann, transfers the object from its original 
box into a different square box.  When Sally returns, participants are asked where Sally 
will look for the object.  Thus, in the Sally-and-Anne-task, participants must inhibit their 
knowledge of where the object is located (which has been moved from a previous 
location) to correctly identify where Sally thinks the object is located (which is a false-
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belief).  Preschool children give responses to this task and variations of this task from the 
knowledge of their own perspective instead of the point of view of the agent, which is 
what is being asked of them (Cassidy, 1998; Saltmarsh, Mitchell, & Robinson, 1995)   
When children’s inhibitory control improves they are more likely to inhibit their 
own perspective and explicitly acknowledge that the other agent has a false belief (Leslie 
et al., 2004).  The ability to set aside one’s own knowledge is considered one of the 
cognitive requirements to passing false belief tasks (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998).  In fact, children’s performance on perspective-
taking tasks has been shown to correlate with false belief tasks (Doherty & Wimmer, 
2005; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009; Perner & Leekam, 2008; Wimmer & Doherty, 
2011).  Perner and Roessler (2012) discussed that to pass a false belief task children must 
be able to switch between their own perspective and that of an agent’s.  There is also 
evidence beyond false belief tasks that children in general formulate ideas about others 
using their own egocentric perspective (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, & Andrews, 1989; 
Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976; Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994). 
Even though children are capable of switching between self and other 
perspectives after the age of 4, adults continue to make egocentric errors (Epley et al., 
2004; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998) in addition to errors in perspective taking tasks 
(Keysar, 1994).  For instance, after a series of experiments, Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, 
and Gilovich (2004) concluded that adults make judgments regarding other peoples’ 
perspectives by making serial adjustments from their own egocentric bias.  That is, when 
considering someone else’s perspective, participants start with their egocentric bias as an 
anchor and make adjustments from this point of view. 
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There is evidence that suggests that even though adults are prone to egocentric 
perspectives they are better than children at correcting away from their initial egocentric 
perspective (Epley et al., 2004).  Nevertheless, several bodies of literature suggest that a 
pervasive cognitive bias toward egocentrism persists into adulthood and influences a 
wide range of social judgments  (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, 
Cassidy, & Baron, 2003).  The current study provides evidence that older adults 
continue to be prone to egocentric interference.   
At least one study examined visual perspective taking across the adult lifespan.  
Inagaki et al. (2002) examined young adult (m = 22.2 years old), middle-aged (m = 45.8 
years old), and older adult (m = 74.6 years old) performance on two variations of 
Piaget’s Three Mountain Task (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956).  Participants viewed two cubes 
sitting on a two by two grid.  In one variation of the task, participants were required to 
mentally rotate the grid and indicate where the cubes would be located after the grid was 
rotated.  In the other variation, participants were required to imagine what their 
perspective would be if they moved to a different location.  The former task measured 
the participant’s ability to mentally rotate an image (i.e., object-mental rotation) whereas 
the latter task measured participant’s ability to represent a different perspective (i.e., 
subject-mental rotation).  Results indicated that older adults made more egocentric errors 
than young adults and middle-aged adults on the subject-mental rotation but not the 
object-mental rotation task.  Inagaki et al. (2002) interpreted these results to suggest that 
older adults had more difficulty with imagining another individual’s perspective but 
demonstrated preserved object rotation ability.  In the current study no age comparisons 
can be made; however, it is interesting to consider the evidence from Inagaki et al.’s 
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(2002) study that older adults demonstrated an increase in egocentric errors compared to 
young and middle-aged adults when they were asked to take a different perspective but 
not when they were asked to mentally rotate an object.  
Altercentric Interference   
The results from the current study did not find evidence of altercentric 
interference effects in older adults.  Thus, there is no evidence present that older adults 
automatically judged the agent’s perspective.  These results sit in direct contrast to three 
studies using young adult participants and one study with 6, 8 and 10 year old children as 
participants.  To be clear, Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Scott (2010) were 
the first to examine level-1 perspective taking in adults and found that participants were 
significantly slower when judging self perspective when the agent’s perspective did not 
match their own.  In a study investigating level-1 perspective taking in adults and 
children aged 6 to 10 years old, results indicated adults were overall faster but were not 
better at reducing irrelevant perspective intrusions compared to the children (Surtees & 
Apperly, 2012); thus, there were no age-related differences in regards to egocentric and 
altercentric effects.  In contrast, the results from the current study found no evidence that 
older adults automatically process the perspective of the agent when they are being asked 
to judge their own perspective. 
While it is important to be cautious about what can be extrapolated from the 
absence of evidence, it is worthwhile to consider possible explanations regarding the lack 
of altercentric interference effects in older adults.  For one, it is possible that the 
automatic and cognitively efficient system declines with age.  The second possibility is 
that there are limits to the automatic system and the cognitive capacity of older adults 
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exceeds these limits.  Lastly, it is possible that the model as conceptualized by Apperly 
and colleagues overestimated the degree to which the automatic processes are free of 
executive control.  These possibilities are considered in turn.    
First, one possible explanation is that automatic cognitive processes associated 
with mental state understanding decline with age.  That is, the results of the current study 
are in direct opposition to the findings of three previous studies (with young adult 
samples and six to ten year old children) that suggest that level-1 visual perspective 
taking involve cognitively efficient and automatic processes.  Thus, it is possible that the 
cognitively efficient system present in children and young adults deteriorates during the 
aging process.  This offers an explanation for the research that suggests mental state 
understanding declines with age above and beyond domain-general cognitive processes.  
For example, in a review of theory of mind during aging, Moran (2013) concluded that 
there is evidence of age-related decline associated with mental state understanding that is 
at least partially independent of general cognitive decline.   
Several authors have suggested that moving away from egocentric bias requires 
cognitive effort.  When considering the evidence in the current study that older adults 
are prone to egocentric interference but not to interference from other’s perspectives, it 
may be the case that during aging, taking another individual’s perspective requires more 
cognitive effort compared to young adults.  For example, studies have found age-related 
decline in mental state stories but not in control stories (i.e., the control stories were not 
negatively correlated with age but the mental state stories were).  This differential 
performance between theory of mind and control stories suggest that age-related 
impairments are specifically due to difficulties with making mental state attributions and 
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not simply due to general cognitive decline (Charlton et al., 2009; Sullivan & Ruffman, 
2004).  Thus, it is possible that an age-related impairment in cognitively efficient 
mechanisms for mental state understanding may be contributing to the age-related 
deficits in theory of mind tasks.  That is, the evidence that suggests older adults 
demonstrate mental state understanding decline that is not fully explained by general 
cognitive decline (i.e., domain-general decline) might be partially due to a loss of 
cognitively efficient processing for representing other’s mental states during the aging 
process. 
The suggestion that automatic processes in mental state understanding may 
decline with age diverges from the literature that suggests that implicit processes are less 
likely to decline compared to resources associated with high cognitive control (e.g., 
Zelazo & Craik, 2004).  For instance, there is evidence that implicit memory is stable 
during the aging process (Ballesteros & Reales, 2004).  Fleischman, Wilson, Gabrieli, 
Bienias, and Bennett (2004) conducted a longitudinal study and found that explicit 
memory declined over 4 years and implicit memory remained stable.  Other cognitive 
domains that have been shown to demonstrate resilience to age-related change are 
implicit learning (Gaillard, Destrebecqz, Michiels, & Cleeremans, 2009) and implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes (Hummert, Gartska, O’Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002).   
The differential age-related decline between implicit and explicit processes fits 
with neuropsychological research that suggests that implicit and explicit memory are 
disassociated (Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  Therefore, the results from the current study 
are particularly striking because of the contrast to evidence that implicit processes are 
relatively impervious to age-related decline.  It should be emphasized that the level-1 
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visual perspective taking task employed in the current study is not an implicit task.  The 
task requires an explicit response and the task demands a relatively high degree of effort 
and attention on the part of the participants to complete the task.  Recall that in order to 
make a response, participants must first keep in mind the perspective (i.e., self or other) 
and the number shown on the screen, and then subsequently make a selection (i.e., an 
explicit decision) regarding the number of dots that can be viewed from the perspective 
that was indicated to them.  In this task, implicit perspective taking is inferred by 
comparing the consistent to inconsistent perspectives.  It should be stressed, however, 
that when participants are required to give their own perspective (i.e., self conditions) 
they are not required to explicitly judge the agent’s perspective.  Therefore, comparing 
the difference in reaction times between consistent and inconsistent trials represents a 
good test for implicit perspective taking.  Thus, if it is indeed the case that a cognitively 
efficient and automatic system for representing other’s mental states declines with age, 
then this rests in opposition to the evidence that implicit cognitive processes in other 
domains are resistant to age-related decline.  
Earlier I suggested that there are three points of view regarding the lack of 
evidence of altercentric interference in the current older adult sample.  First, I argued that 
the automatic and efficient cognitive processes associated with mental state 
understanding might actually be in decline with age.  The second possibility is that the 
cognitively efficient mechanism underlying level-1 visual perspective taking is 
constrained by limits, which older adults do not meet.  The conceptualization of limits of 
cognitive efficiency is built around the dual route model of mental state understanding.  
In Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) framework, the dual route model is based on the 
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premise of two discrete systems that work in parallel; one system is characterized by fast 
and automatic processing, while the other system is slow and cognitively demanding.  If 
there are distinct systems for understanding mental states, then Apperly (2010) contends 
that there must be limits to the cognitively efficient module.  That is, in order for the dual 
route approach to be a useful theory, the model must make clear the limits of these 
independent systems.  Moreover, the argument is made that understanding the limits of 
each system is necessary to avoid the risk of a circular description of a dual route model 
of mental state understanding.  One limit, according to Apperly and colleagues, on the 
cognitive efficient system is that it can support level-1 visual perspectives only and not 
level-2 visual perspectives or belief reasoning (Apperly, 2010; Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010).  Surtees and Apperly (2012) 
suggested that cognitive efficiency in level-1 perspective taking is likely limited to what a 
person can see versus how something is seen demonstrating another limit of the efficient 
system.   
Related to the limits of cognitive efficiency, Apperly considers the importance of 
processing speed.  He points out that for mental state understanding to be successfully 
employed in social interactions it must occur fast enough.  That is, the utility of social 
cognition for the facilitation of social interaction is that information processing must 
occur quick enough to be put to use.  It is interesting to consider that slower processing 
speed in older adults might interrupt the ability of perspective taking to occur 
automatically.  To be precise, if cognitive efficiency is limited by processing speed, then 
it is possible that older adult processing speed exceeds this limit.  The hypothesis that the 
cognitive efficient system is limited by speed of processing requires further investigation.  
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Finally, an additional consideration is that the model as conceptualized by 
Apperly and colleagues overestimated the degree to which the automatic processes are 
free of executive resources.  On the surface this appears to challenge the very argument 
of an automatic system; however, it is possible that the cognitively efficient system might 
at least involve some low-level executive resources.  Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, and Dux 
(2012) designed a study to test if implicit theory of mind is influenced by executive 
control.  Recall that the premise of a dual task design is to examine if one process 
(measured by a secondary task) interrupts a primary task.  Schneider et al. (2012) found 
that implicit theory of mind (as measured by eye movement while participants watched a 
false belief scene) was disrupted under the dual task conditions suggesting that even 
implicit mental state representation involves some degree of executive resources.  In 
terms of reconciling Schneider et al.’s results with the current study, several details must 
be pointed out.  The significant task by perspective interaction in the current study 
indicated that the dual task was significantly more difficult compared to the alone task 
when older adults took their own perspective but not when they took the agent’s 
perspective.  Although it is unclear why the dual task appeared to increase cognitive load 
for self trials, the results from the current study suggest that the dual task did not increase 
cognitive load when participants made judgments based on the other perspective.  This 
seems to indicate that taking another perspective does not involve inhibitory processes; 
however, the lack of altercentric interference effects in the current study suggests that 
taking the agent’s perspective was not automatic for older adults.  These two findings 
appear to be contradictory; however, it is possible that these seemingly divergent results 
are a consequence of the cognitively efficient system involving some low-level executive 
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resources.  If the cognitively efficient system is not completely free from executive 
control, then older adults may not show evidence of the automatic processing due to their 
reduced executive resources.  In other words, the reduced executive functioning of older 
adults may prevent the cognitively efficient system from being deployed.  Alternatively, 
if the secondary task in the current study was not sufficiently difficult, then the executive 
resources may have not been taxed to a large enough degree to significantly impact the 
dual task.  It is important to re-emphasize that no definitive conclusions can be made 
regarding the lack of altercentric effects in the current study.  This is to say, it should be 
stressed that the null finding cannot be accepted as true and the disparate results require 
further investigation.  
In considering the argument that the cognitive efficient system may recruit some 
low-level executive resources, then this may explain the dissimilar results of Schneider et 
al. (2012) and Qureshi et al. (2010).  To review, in contrast to the results of Schneider et 
al. (2012), Qureshi et al.’s (2010) dual task did not disrupt automatic perspective taking.  
However, these two studies used different primary and secondary tasks.  Schneider et 
al.’s (2012) primary task was tapping implicit theory of mind and verbal working 
memory was required for the secondary task.  Qureshi et al.’s (2010) primary task 
required level-1 visual perspective taking and inhibitory control was required for the 
secondary task.  The former study found evidence of disruption of an implicit theory of 
mind task whereas the latter study did not find evidence of disruption of implicit level-1 
visual perspective taking.  Two considerations come to mind when contrasting the results 
and task demands of these two studies.  For one, several decades of evidence have 
demonstrated a strong relationship between theory of mind and verbal working memory.  
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Secondly, little is known about the task demands of the level-1 visual perpective taking.  
In fact, the current study was the first to examine the contribution of working memory on 
the level-1 visual perspective taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010).  The dual 
task study designed by Qureshi et al. (2010) and the current study, are the only two 
studies that have examined how inhibition impacts level-1 visual perspective taking.  
Qureshi et al. (2010) found inhibition control did not interrupt automatic processes.  The 
current study, however, did not find evidence of automatic processes in older adults; thus, 
inhibitory control in the current study is moot. 
It seems plausible that these two abilities, implicit theory of mind and level-1 
visual perspective taking, represented different degrees of cognitively efficient processes.  
In fact, as discussed earlier, Apperly (2010) suggested that level-1 but not level-2 visual 
perspective taking is cognitively efficient.  Together, the results from Schneider et al. 
(2012) and Qureshi et al. (2010) suggest that implicit theory of mind may draw on 
working memory aspects of executive control while level-1 visual perspective taking 
involves fewer executive resources.  However, there is not currently enough evidence to 
rule out the possibility that the cognitively efficient system related to level-1 visual 
perspective is completely free from executive resources.  Finally, it also cannot be ruled 
out that the reason why older adults did not automatically process another agent’s 
perspective is because of their decreased inhibition control compared to young adults.   
The Role of Inhibition Control on  
Selection and Calculation 
 
  The third and forth hypotheses tested the effect of adding a secondary task to the 
primary level-1 perspective taking task.  The secondary task recruited executive 
functioning resources, which was intended to specifically require inhibition control.  
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Thus, these hypotheses examined the role of inhibitory processes in level-1 perspective 
taking.   
The third hypothesis investigated the role of inhibition during selection processes 
under the premise that inhibition is required when participants need to select between two 
possible perspectives (i.e., self or other perspective).  In other words, in order to select the 
correct perspective, the alternate perspective would need to be inhibited.  The task by 
consistency interaction tested the third hypothesis, with the prediction that inhibitory 
resources would be involved in selection processes.  This hypothesis was grounded in the 
prediction that both alone and dual-task conditions would result in a consistency effect 
(i.e., inconsistent > consistent) with a significantly larger effect for inconsistent trials in 
the dual task compared to the alone condition; however no significant task by consistency 
interaction was found in the current study.  Therefore, the current study provided no 
evidence regarding the role of inhibition during selection processes. 
The final hypothesis relating to the level-1 visual perspective taking task tested 
the role of inhibition control on calculation processes.  I hypothesized that participants 
would demonstrate a larger altercentric effect for the dual task compared to the alone 
condition.  This hypothesis was grounded in the logic of a dual task design, which 
suggests that a secondary task will preclude a process involved in a primary task if the 
two tasks involve the same cognitive resources.  In the case of the current study, if 
inhibition control were involved in the cognitive mechanisms underling the altercentric 
effect, then the secondary task would obviate the altercentric interference.  As indicated 
by the significant interaction between consistency and perspective, however, no 
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altercentric effect was found in the current study.  Therefore, the forth hypothesis was 
not supported.  
Apperly (2010) suggested that since both children and adults are prone to making 
judgments about others based on their own perspectives (i.e., egocentric biases), this 
suggests that moving away from such biases requires cognitive effort.  Based on the 
results from the current study, however, the role of inhibition control is unclear.  In the 
current study, older adults were prone to egocentric interference, which is consistent with 
research suggesting that adults and children are prone to egocentric bias.  On the other 
hand, the egocentric interference was not larger for the dual task condition, therefore 
there is no evidence regarding the role of executive functioning in terms of inhibition 
impacting the interference.  In addition, no altercentric interference was found, thus the 
role of inhibition on automatic processing of other’s perspectives could not be directly 
analyzed.  To be clear, both of the hypotheses examining the role of inhibition were not 
supported; as a consequence, no inferences can be made regarding the role of inhibitory 
control aspects of executive functioning in level-1 visual perspective taking.   
Even though the role of executive functioning when taking the agent’s perspective 
could not be directly assessed, there is some evidence in the current study that taking 
another individuals’ perspective does require cognitive effort for older adults.  The 
follow-up analysis examining the significant interaction between perspective (i.e., self 
versus other) and task (i.e., alone versus dual) indicated that the dual task was 
significantly slower for the self perspective but there was no difference between the alone 
(999 ms) and dual-task conditions (1021 ms) for the other perspective.  This suggests that 
taking the agent’s perspective was equally challenging for older adults in the alone and 
   
 
 
95 
the dual task conditions, which may be the result of the other perspective being effortful 
for older adults to process.  This is to say that for the current sample, it appears the other 
perspective was always effortful (i.e., equally effortful for both the alone and dual-task 
trials), whereas taking the self perspective was effortful for the dual task but not for the 
alone condition.  
Gender Differences   
When reaction time was used as dependent variable results indicated that males 
were overall faster than females on the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  The effect 
size (d =. 73) indicated that the gender effect of reaction time was moderate to large in 
magnitude (Cohen, 1988).  No significant gender interactions were found, indicating that 
males and females did not differ in the relative performance on egocentric or altercentric 
interference effects.  In addition, no differential gender differences were found for alone 
or dual-task conditions.  Studies examining gender differences in reaction time 
consistently demonstrate that males respond significantly faster compared to females (e.g., 
Adam et al., 1999; Der & Deary, 2006).  In addition to an overall reaction time advantage, 
males tend to demonstrate the greatest advantage on visual compared to auditory tasks 
(Spierer, Petersen, Duffy, Corcoran, & Rawls-Martin, 2010).  Thus, the moderate to large 
gender effect in the current study might be partially due to the visual component of the 
perspective taking task.   
The analysis using processing costs as the dependent variable did not reveal any 
gender effects.  When considering that processing costs are calculated by dividing 
reaction time by the percent of correct trials, it appears that while males were faster than 
females, they were not more accurate than females.  Previous research suggests that 
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gender differences in reaction time are partially a consequence of a speed-accuracy 
tradeoff; males are faster than females but the quicker speed comes with a cost of males 
being more error prone (Reimers & Maylor, 2006).  In line with the speed-accuracy 
tradeoff, the results of the current study suggest that while males had the tendency to be 
faster than females, gender difference were diminished when accuracy was accounted for.  
Summary   
In summary, the main effect for consistency cannot be interpreted without first 
examining the significant interaction between consistency and perspective.  Follow-up 
analyses indicated that there was a significant consistency effect for other but not for self 
conditions.  Therefore, the current study found evidence that older adults were prone to 
egocentric but not altercentric interference effects.  Thus, support for the first hypothesis 
was found but no evidence was found for the second hypothesis.   
Following the logic of Qureshi et al. (2010), I differentiated between selection and 
calculation processes during the perspective taking task.  The third hypothesis examined 
the role of inhibitory processes in selection processes, which was not supported as no 
interaction was found between task and consistency.  This hypothesis would have been 
supported if both consistent and inconsistent conditions were slower for the dual task 
with inconsistent conditions disproportionately impacted.  In regards to the forth 
hypothesis, which examined if executive functioning is involved in calculation processes 
(i.e., before a response is made), I hypothesized that dual-task trials would result in larger 
altercentric interference effects compared to the alone trials; however, the significant 
interaction between perspective and consistency indicated that no altercentric effect was 
found.  Furthermore, an altercentric effect was not found in the alone or the dual-task 
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conditions (as would have been indicated by a three-way interaction between perspective, 
consistency, and task).  Consequently, the forth hypothesis was not supported.  
In regards to answering the first research question, the current study failed to find 
evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 perspective taking in an older adult 
sample.  The lack of evidence of older adults automatically processing the agent’s 
perspective was considered from three viewpoints.  First, it is possible that cognitively 
efficient perspective taking declines with age, which offers an explanation for the 
research that suggests that mental state understanding declines above and beyond 
domain-general cognitive processes.  Second, Apperly (2010) asserted that one of the 
requisites of cognitive efficiency must be that there are limits to the capacity of the 
system; I suggested that age-related deficits in processing speed might impede cognitive 
efficiency in older adults.  Finally, I considered the possibility that the automatic and 
cognitively efficient system may not be completely free from inhibition control.  At this 
time, the veracity of these three hypotheses remains unknown.  
Theory of Mind, Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking, 
 and Working Memory 
 
Prior to discussing the results of the hierarchical regression, I will first discuss the 
current sample’s performance on the working memory measures.  Digit span from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–IV and symbol span from the Wechsler Memory 
Scale–IV were used as measures of verbal and spatial working memory respectively.  The 
current sample means and standard deviations on the digit span forward, backward, and 
sequence were almost identical to a young adult sample in another study (n = 1600; 
Salthouse & Saklofske, 2010).  The current sample means and standard deviation were 
10.21 (2.28), 8.48 (1.85), and 8.86 (1.83) respectively.  Salthouse and Saklofske (2010) 
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reported the following means and standard deviations for a young adult sample: 10.5 
(2.4), 8.8 (2.5), and 8.7 (2.3) respectively.  Furthermore, the mean symbol span score for 
current study was 21.52 with a standard deviation of 5.51, which is comparable to the 
mean of 21.04 and standard deviation of 8.7 from a large-scale study (n = 1399) of adults 
aged 16-90 years old (Salthouse, 2009b).  As previously discussed in chapter two, older 
adults typically demonstrate greater variance compared to young adults; however, the 
current sample preformed equivalent to young adult samples on the working memory 
measures in terms of central tendency and variance.  
Theory of Mind and Working  
Memory 
 
H5  Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.  
  
The hierarchical regression analysis indicated that my fifth hypothesis was 
supported.  That is, verbal working memory contributed to theory of mind story 
performance above and beyond spatial working memory.  Although verbal working 
memory contributed significantly to the model, only 12.8% of the theory of mind 
variance was explained.  Spatial working memory did not contribute significantly to the 
model when it was added at the second step.   
Overall, the model including both verbal and spatial working memory explained 
15.4% of the variance.  These results suggest that although verbal working memory does 
impact older adult theory of mind performance, most of the variance was not accounted 
for.  Before considering other factors that may contribute to individual differences in 
theory of mind performance in older adults, it should be noted that the research 
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examining the impact of working memory on age-related theory of mind declines to date 
has been equivocal.  
McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) found that older adults performed significantly 
worse than young adults on second order theory of mind but not first order theory of 
mind tasks.  The authors analyzed the older adult error rates and found almost 70% were 
due their failure of considering multiple pieces of information.  Additionally, participants 
made more errors on a theory of mind task when concurrently performing a secondary 
working memory task (i.e., a dual task) compared to when the theory of mind task was 
performed alone.  The error rate analysis and dual task results from this study both 
suggest that theory of mind performance is mediated by working memory during aging.   
In contrast, in a study that manipulated working memory demands on two theory 
of mind tasks, Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) found that older adults (m= 73 years old) 
performed significantly worse than younger adults on both tasks; that is, older adults still 
showed theory of mind impairments even when working memory demands were reduced.  
Based on these results, Sullivan and Ruffman argued that theory of mind abilities decline 
in older adults independent of working memory and general cognitive abilities.  Other 
studies have also found that older adults perform worse on both theory of mind and 
control stories (German & Hehman, 2006; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007), which 
suggests that observed performance declines are not specifically associated with 
understanding mental states but are instead associated with cognitive functioning. 
In addition to working memory, previous research has demonstrated that 
inhibition control plays a role in mental state understanding in older adults (e.g., Duval et 
al., 2011; Charlton et al., 2009).  German and Hehman (2006) found that older adult 
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performance on reasoning about other’s beliefs correlated with inhibitory control, 
working memory, and processing speed.  Systematic increases in inhibition demands 
resulted in performance declines for both young and older adults; however, older adults 
were disproportionately worse than younger adults on tasks with higher inhibition control 
demands.  
It should be noted that the association between theory of mind and working 
memory and inhibition has been demonstrated in developmental and young adult 
samples.  Research suggests that during the preschool years inhibitory control (e.g., 
Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Hala, Hug, & 
Henderson, 2003) and working memory (Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006) critically 
impacts theory of mind performance.  Individual differences on theory of mind story 
tasks in young adult samples also has been demonstrated to be driven, at least in part, by 
working memory (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 
1998).  For instance, Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2010) found that adults with low working 
memory capacity were significantly worse at making mental state attributions than adults 
with high working memory capacity.  These results suggest that working memory is an 
important executive capacity for explicit theory of mind performance in development as 
well as through older adulthood.  However, the current study did not examine young 
adults performance and did not examine executive components beyond working memory 
thus, these two issues cannot be directly assessed in the current study.   
Collectively, an examination of the literature to date as well as the results from 
the current study suggest that although working memory does mediate theory of mind 
performance in older adults, there are other factors that contribute to individual 
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differences in theory of mind during aging.  It is possible that some of the studies did not 
find evidence of working memory contributing to older adults theory of mind 
performance because only a small amount of variance is explained by working memory.  
Most the studies have used small sample sizes (e.g., n = 24 older adults, Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004), which reduce the power to detect a small effect of working memory on 
theory of mind performance.  Furthermore, many of the studies have used a small number 
of items to measure theory of mind performance in older adults (e.g., German & Hehman, 
2006; Maylor et al., 2002).  The current study addressed these issues by including a 
sample size of 42 older adult participants and 20 items from the strange stories task (i.e., 
10 items for the theory of mind stories and 10 items for the control stories).   
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking  
and Working Memory 
 
H6  Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance 
  on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared verbal working  
  memory.   
 
Participants completed the level-1 visual perspective taking task alone and as a 
dual task.  Accordingly, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted that 
examined the role of working memory on each of the outcome variables (i.e., processing 
costs for the alone task and processing costs for the dual task).  Both hierarchical 
regression analyses indicated that neither spatial nor verbal working memory contributed 
to the model significantly.  Thus, the current study did not find evidence of the role of 
working memory on level-1 visual perspective taking performance.  
No previous studies have examined the contribution of working memory on level-
1 visual perspective taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010).  I predicted that 
spatial working memory would explain level-1 visual perspective taking above verbal 
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working memory based on an informal assessment of the task demands.  To complete the 
task, participants must keep in mind two pieces of information.  That is, participants must 
remember the perspective (i.e., self or other) and then the number (i.e., 0, 1, 2, or 3) 
indicated on the computer screen to be able to give an accurate response.  Moreover, 
these two stimuli are presented for only 750 ms and participants cannot go back to view 
these stimuli once they have been presented.  In addition, since the task is visual and 
includes a spatial component regarding the location of the red dots on the walls, I 
examined the role of both spatial and verbal working memory on performance.  In the 
current study, symbol span was used to measure spatial working memory since it assesses 
both the storage and manipulation of visual stimuli.  In consideration of the requirements 
of the task, I predicted that spatial working memory would explain level-1 visual 
perspective taking above verbal working memory.  Additionally, when considering that 
two stimuli are presented successively and participants are required to subsequently use 
that information to make a response, I was also interested in examining if verbal working 
memory would make a contribution to the model.  The current study, however, does not 
indicate that spatial or verbal working memory contributes to level-1 visual perspective 
taking in older adults.   
These results strengthen the utility of using this task as a measure of automatic 
perspective taking.  Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the specific feature that is 
assumed to measure automatic processing is a contrast between consistent and 
inconsistent trials for self perspective conditions.  Rather than measuring automatic 
processes directly, an automatic mechanism is inferred by examining the relative 
difference between consistent and inconsistent trials.  As a result, even if working 
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memory did contribute to individual differences on level-1 visual perspective taking, the 
automatic component of the task would still be compelling if an altercentric effect was 
found. 
In comparing the task demands of level-1 visual perspective taking with theory of 
mind stories, it is not surprising that these two tasks do not involve the same working 
memory demands.  Still, prior to the current study, the working memory demands of 
level-1 visual perspective taking had not been explored.  The results from the current 
study indicated that level-1 visual perspective taking did not load on working memory 
while theory of mind performance did; this illustrates the usefulness of these tasks as 
tapping different components of mental state understanding.  Specifically, the 
disassociation between these two tasks strengthens the case for conceptualizing level-1 
visual perspective taking as containing relatively more implicit processes compared to the 
theory of mind task, which involves relatively more explicit processes. 
Limitations 
The current study has several limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting the results.  First, even though an aging in place sample was obtained with 
the goal of increasing the generalizability of the results, purposeful non-probability 
sampling methods were used.  Therefore, there are limits of the generalizability of the 
sample to the wider population of older adults.  Examining the demographics of the 
current sample gives another indication that the results may not generalize to the broader 
population.  For example, the careers reported by the participants include engineers, 
college faculty, computer programmers, and a physician (Appendix D).  In addition, as 
indicated by self-report, the sample was highly educated.  It is plausible that the 
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intelligence of the current sample was skewed to the right hand tail of the normal 
distribution (i.e., negative skew); however, no measure of intelligence was obtained thus, 
intellectual ability was not controlled for in the current study.  In addition, the sample 
was not screened for mild cognitive impairment; therefore, it is unknown if the sample in 
the current study contained individuals who have symptoms of mild cognitive 
impairment.  
In regards to the level-visual perspective taking task, three limitations come to 
mind.  First, since no young adult sample was obtained in the current study caution is 
needed when making inferences regarding age-related performance.  All discussions 
regarding contrasting age differences have been made based on three prior studies and 
thus no direct contrast is available in the current study.  Second, it is possible that the 
dual task was not sufficiently difficult for the older adult sample.  Interestingly, the 
participants verbalized how challenging they felt the task was; however, when examining 
the alone compared to the dual task conditions, little evidence is present that the dual task 
adequately increased cognitive load.  Even though the secondary task employed in the 
current study was designed to tap inhibition control, there is the possibility that it was not 
as difficult as the dual task used by Qureshi et al. (2010) or requires different underlying 
mechanisms.  The secondary task used by Qureshi et al. (2010) required that participants 
tapped a box in the opposite direction of the number of tones that they heard.  That is, 
participants tapped once if they heard two tones and vice versa.  It is possible that the 
number of disks presented in the primary task and the number of tones presented in the 
secondary task was a confound that increased the working memory load in addition to the 
inhibitory demands during the dual task.  In the current study, the confounding variable 
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regarding the numerical aspect of the stimuli in the primary and secondary tasks was 
removed; thus, the dual task employed in the current study cannot be directly compared 
to the dual task used by Qureshi et al.  Third, the secondary task in the current study may 
not tap the same inhibitory processes that are involved in the perspective taking task.   
In terms of the hierarchical regression results, two limitations should be 
considered when interpreting the results.  First, the range of variance in the criterion and 
predictor variables were relatively low.  The theory of mind story task had a mean of 
15.48 (out of a 20 points possible) with a standard deviation of 2.54; however, there were 
three outliers with low scores that were disconnected from the rest of the distribution.  
The mean and standard deviation of the theory of mind story task with these three outliers 
dropped are 16.03 and 1.75, indicating that the variance for the majority of the 
distribution was small.  Secondly, the older adults in the current sample performed more 
typical of a young adult sample on the working memory measures.  As discussed in 
chapter two of the current study, older adults typically have wider variability compared to 
young adults; however, the currents sample did not display this pattern.  If the current 
sample is more homogenous compared to the population (i.e., low amount of variance for 
the current sample is an artifact of the current study) then it is possible that there was 
reduced statistical power to detect the role of working memory on the level-1 perspective 
taking task.  That is, the low amount of variance for the current sample could have 
limited the statistical power to detect associations between variables.  
Future Research 
With the goal of examining age-related differences in mental state understanding, 
it would be important to compare the results from the current study to a young adult 
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sample.  Thus, the first recommendation for future research is to employ the same method 
used in the current study with a young adult sample.  In this way, an age comparison can 
be made for both the level-1 visual perspective taking and the theory of mind story task.   
In obtaining a young adult sample, the first question would be to examine if 
young adults display egocentric and altercentric interference effects using the level-1 
visual perspective taking task as reported in previous research (Samson et al.,2010; 
Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010).  Although there is no reason to believe 
that the findings would differ from the previous three studies using young adult samples, 
it would be valuable to obtain data from a young adult sample for a direct comparison.  If 
results from a younger adult sample mimic that of the previous studies conducted by 
Apperly and colleagues, then this would provide further evidence that automatic 
processes decline with age.   
With the addition of a young adult sample, it would be interesting to examine if 
older adults demonstrate larger egocentric interference compared to young adults.  
Previous research suggests that older adults are more prone compared to young adults to 
egocentric errors (Inagaki et al., 2002).  Egocentric interference in the level-1 visual 
perspective taking task is indicated by larger processing costs for inconsistent compared 
to consistent trials when judging the other perspective.  Currently, it is unknown if age-
related changes in egocentric interference would be demonstrated on the level-1 visual 
perspective taking task.  Finally, with a young adult sample, I recommend comparing 
older adult performance to young adult performance on the day night task.  German and 
Hehman (2006) found that older adults did not perform significantly worse compared 
young adults in a version of a day night task.  Using an inhibition task that does not 
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demonstrate age-related decline would be ideal in terms of controlling for the difficulty 
of the secondary task for both groups.     
The next recommendation for future research is to further investigate gender 
differences on the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  The current study found that 
males were significantly faster compared to females as indicated by an overall gender 
effect.  No significant gender interactions were found; however, when including gender 
as a between factor variable, and considering the number of conditions in the ANOVA 
(i.e., 2 x 2 x 2 x 2), the sample size in the current study is low.  A power analysis was 
conducted for a mixed design (i.e., using within-subjects and between-subjects variables) 
using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  With a medium 
effect size (ηp2 = .3), alpha set to .05, power set to .95, and the correlation between 
repeated measures set to .7, a sample size of 52 (26 males and 26 females) would be 
necessary.  Therefore, an additional 10 more participants should be collected to 
adequately examine gender interactions.   
In terms of examining gender, an interesting trend was found for the interaction 
between perspective (i.e., self versus other) and consistency (i.e., consistent versus 
inconsistent).  There was a tendency for females but not males to be slower for the 
inconsistent compared to the consistent trials for the Self perspective (i.e., females but not 
males trended towards an altercentric interference effect).  In contrast, both males and 
females were significantly slower for the inconsistent compared to the consistent trials for 
the Other perspective (i.e., demonstrating an egocentric interference effect).  Even though 
no significant gender interactions were present in the current study, females demonstrated 
a 113 ms advantage in the consistent compared to inconsistent trials for the Self 
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perspective; wheresas, males did not show any difference between inconsistent and 
consistent trials for the Self perspective.  It should be reemphasized that this gender 
interaction was not statistically significant, which indicates that although females were 
numerically slower for inconsistent compared to consistent trials, females did not 
demonstrate a significant altercentric interference effect.  The previous three studies that 
used this task (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010) did 
not report gender results, therefore it is unclear whether no gender differences were found 
in the prior studies or if the researches did not examine gender (See Figures 9 and 10 for 
an illustration of this gender trend).     
It is interesting to consider the possibility that females may be prone to 
altercentric interference effects while males may not be.  This finding would be 
consistent with research that has found gender differences in other areas of social 
cognition.  For instance, previous research suggest that females demonstrate enhanced 
eye gaze cueing effects (Bayliss, Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005), are more accurate in face 
emotion recognition (Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010) and reading 
nonverbal behavior (Hall, 1978), and are more sensitive to gleaning information from 
eyes (Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013) compared to males.  Thus, it 
would be noteworthy to examine this three-way interaction (i.e., perspective by 
consistency by gender) with a larger sample size.  
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Figure. 9. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Males.  
Notes: This illustrates a signfiant consistency effect for the Other but not Self 
perspective, which corresponds to an egocentric but not an altercentric interference 
effect.  
 
 
Figure. 10. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Females.  
Notes: This illustrates the signfiant consistency effect for Other perspective and a trend 
towards a consistency effect for Self perspective. This corresponds to an egocentric effect 
and a trend towards an altercentric interferene effect; however, the latter was not 
significant. 
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The final recommendation for future research is to replicate the current study 
using a different sample of older adults.  In the current study, the lack of evidence of 
older adults automatically processing other people’s perspectives will only be 
substantiated if theses findings are replicated.  Furthermore, if the findings do replicate, 
then it would be advised to investigate possible explanations regarding the mechanisms 
of such age-related changes.  That is, if future evidence supports differential automatic 
processes related to mental state understanding in young compared to older adults, then 
the sources of age-related change should be investigated.  
Apperly proposed that examining the limits of the cognitive efficient system is 
essential to understanding the dual route model of mental state understanding.  Earlier I 
suggested that speed of processing might be a possible limit of the cognitively efficient 
system.  Although I presented an argument that the lack of evidence of automatic 
processes in older adults might be due to a processing speed limit, this hypothesis 
requires further investigation.  One recommendation is to collect processing speed data 
and run a hierarchical regression with processing speed as a predictor variable and level-1 
visual perspective taking as the outcome variable.       
Apperly (2011) has suggested that the role of working memory and inhibition 
may disproportionally impact older adults performance on explicit theory of mind tasks 
(e.g., German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).   In the current study, 
verbal working memory made a statistically significant contribution to explaining theory 
of mind performance, as measured by the Strange Stories Task, however, a large degree 
of variance remained unaccounted for.  Previous research suggests that other executive 
processes are related to theory of mind performance, such as inhibition control (Charlton 
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et al., 2009; Duval et al., 2011) and processing speed (German & Hehman, 2006).  In the 
current study, measures of inhibition control and processing speed were not obtained; 
thus, these executive processes could not be examined.  It would be useful to conduct two 
hierarchical regressions with measures of inhibition control and speed of processing as 
the predictor variables and both the level-1 visual perspective taking and theory of mind 
story tasks as the outcome variables.  Reaction time data from the Day-Night task that 
was employed for the current study (i.e., the secondary task that was used for the dual 
task level-1 visual perspective taking task) would be easy to obtain as a measure of 
inhibition.  Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare the variance explained by 
inhibition in young and older adult samples.  Based on the robust evidence of age-related 
decline in inhibitory control, I would hypothesize that individual differences on the Day-
Night task would mediate performance on the level-1 visual perspective taking task to a 
larger degree in an older adults compared to a young adults.  In addition, since the current 
study was the first to examine the association of working memory on level-1 visual 
perspective taking, it would be useful to replicate the hierarchical regression analysis 
using the same tasks that were conducted in the current study as well as to include 
additional working memory measures. 
Conclusions 
The current study examined mental state understanding in an aging sample from a 
cognitive perspective.  Previous research suggests that children and adults spontaneously 
process other individual’s perspectives (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; 
Qureshi et al., 2010).  Additionally, a significant amount of research also suggests that 
some aspects of mental state understanding involve explicitly mediated processes (e.g., 
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Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007).  For instance, researchers 
have reported individual differences in mental state understanding are related to working 
memory (e.g., Lin et al., 2010) and executive functioning (e.g., Sabbagh et al., 2006).  
Aging is associated with cognitive decline in three areas that are also linked to explicit 
mental state understanding: processing speed, executive functioning, and working 
memory (Charlton et al., 2009).  Therefore, when investigating mental state 
understanding during the aging process, the cognitive resources that are associated with 
mental state understanding must be taken into consideration (Moran, 2013).  The primary 
goal of the current study was to examine cognitively efficient and cognitively effortful 
processes involved in mental state understanding during aging.       
Two tasks were used to investigate mental state understanding in older adults, 
which differ in the degree to which they involve implicit versus explicit processes.  At a 
basic level, mental state understanding involves perceptual processing of another 
individual’s visual perspective (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981).  A level-1 visual 
perspective taking task was used to investigate if older adults demonstrate evidence of 
taking another individuals perspective relatively automatically.  To examine if taking 
another individuals perspective is cognitive efficient, a dual task version of the level-1 
visual perspective taking task was used.  A theory of mind story task measured explicit 
mental state understanding in older adults.  Finally, a hierarchical regression was 
conducted to examine the contribution of spatial and verbal working memory on both the 
level-1 visual perspective taking and theory of mind story tasks.  
The current study, failed to find evidence that older adults automatically take 
another agent’s perspective using a level-1 visual perspective taking task.  In contrast, 
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the evidence in the current study suggests that processing a perspective that differs from 
one’s own perspective is cognitively effortful.  These findings were based on the 
evidence that older adults suffered from egocentric but not altercentric interference 
effects.  Evidence from three previous studies demonstrated that taking the visual 
perspective of another individual involves relatively automatic processes (Samson et al., 
2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010).  Three possible explanations were 
presented regarding the lack of evidence of older adults automatically processing 
another individual’s visual perspective.   
One possible explanation regarding the lack of evidence in the current study of 
automatic processes in level-1 visual perspective taking is that cognitive efficient 
processes may decline during aging.  While there is a substantial amount of evidence 
that suggests explicit mental state understanding does decline with age, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that relatively implicit mental state understanding would be 
impervious to decline.  Hence, the evidence from the current study does not necessarily 
diverge from the larger literature suggesting a dissociable system for understanding 
other’s mental states.  Certainly, if older adults showed evidence of intact automatic and 
cognitively efficient system, then this would provide evidence in support of the dual 
route model in terms of a double disassociation.  However, the evidence that the fast and 
automatic system may decline with age does not inevitably threaten the theoretical 
assumptions of the dual route for mental state understanding.   
Gender was examined in the level-1 visual perspective taking task.  Results 
indicated that males performed significantly faster than females and no significant gender 
interactions were found; however, there was a trend for females but not males to be prone 
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to altercentric interference effects.  I suggested that future research further examine 
possible gender interactions on this task.  The overall faster reaction times for males 
compared to females aligns with the broader literature, which suggests that across the 
adult lifespan that males respond significantly faster on reaction time measures compared 
to females (e.g., Adam et al., 1999; Der & Deary, 2006).    
With the burgeoning field of social cognitive science and the recognition that 
mental state understanding is central to social communication, researchers have 
investigated mental state understanding in a wide range of contexts and populations (Saxe 
& Baron-Cohen, 2006).  One corner of this research has examined mental state 
understanding during the aging process.  To date, an accumulation of research suggests 
that mental state understanding deteriorates during normal aging (Henry et al., 2012; 
Moran, 2013); however, the mechanism underlying the age-related decline is unclear.  
The current study was the first to examine both cognitively efficient and cognitively 
effortful processes in an older adult sample.  No evidence was found of cognitively 
efficient processes relating to level-1 visual perspective taking in the current study.  In 
addition, the current study examined if individual differences in working memory 
contributes to theory of mind and level-1 visual perspective taking performance.  Results 
indicated that a small portion of theory of mind variance was explained by verbal but not 
spatial working memory.  Neither verbal nor spatial working memory contributed to 
level-1 visual perspective taking performance.  When considering the literature to date, it 
seems the degree to which automatic versus effortful mechanisms are involved depends 
on the specific context that mental state understanding is employed.  In terms of mental 
state understanding during aging, the current study provides no evidence that older adults 
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automatically process another agent’s perspective.  However, further research is 
necessary before any conclusions can be made.  In addition, since verbal working 
memory only explained a small degree of variance in the theory of mind story task, future 
research is recommended to investigate the impact of other executive processes that may 
contribute to explicit mental state understanding during the aging process.  
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CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
 
Project Title:    Mental State Understanding in Older Adults 
Researcher:    Rena Kirkland, Educational Psychology Ph.D. Student 
        E-mail:    Thom6071@bears.unco.edu 
 
Advisor:  Marilyn Welsh, Ph.D., Psychological Sciences 
Phone:  (970) 351-2263  E-mail: Marilyn.Welsh@unco.edu 
 
Purpose and Description: The primary purpose of this study is to explore social 
cognitive processes in older adults. Social cognition includes a wide range of 
mental processes related to social interactions. For example, how we think about 
other people, judge other people’s emotions and perspectives, and interpret 
social interactions are various aspects of social cognition. In the current study, 
we are interested in examining two different aspects of social cognition. We are 
also interested in how general cognitive ability, such as performance on a 
vocabulary test, is related to social cognition. 
 
Participating in this study will consist of completing the following tasks:  
• Responding either “yes” or “no” to a computerized task asking about how 
many dots either you can see or the “cartoon” person can see 
• Responding with a press to a computer mouse after a voice says “day” or 
“night” 
• Reading short stories about the interaction of two people and answer 
questions regarding the intentions of the characters in the stories 
• Examining photographs of eyes and choosing one word (from of four 
possible words) that best describes the associated set of eyes  
• Verbally responding to a list of numbers repeated exactly, repeated 
backwards, and repeated in ascending order 
• Examining pictures of shapes and then identifying the correct shapes that 
were previously viewed in the correct order 
 
A 10-dollar gift certificate will be offered to you as a token of our appreciation for 
participating in this study. It is estimated that the data collection described above 
will take 90 minutes to complete; however, you are free to stop this study before 
the completion of the tasks. That is, you are free to withdraw from the study for 
any reason at any time. 
Page 1 of 2 _____ (please initial) 
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Every precaution will be taken to protect confidentiality.  A participant number will 
be assigned to you.  The only identifying information is this consent form, which 
will be filed separately from the data.  That is, your participant number will not be 
connected to your name on this consent form. Data collected and analyzed for 
this study will be kept in a locked cabinet in the College of Psychological 
Sciences at the University of Northern Colorado.  
 
Potential risks in this project are minimal. It is possible that some of the cognitive 
tests will be perceived as stressful. In addition, you will be taking time out of your 
daily life to participate in this study. As a small token of appreciation, a 10-dollar 
gift certificate will be offered to you even if you decide to not complete the study.  
 
It is important that you feel comfortable regarding the purpose of this study and 
what participation involves. Please take this opportunity to ask the researcher 
any questions you have regarding any aspects of this study.  
 
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if 
you begin participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. 
Your decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had an opportunity to 
ask any questions, please sign below if you would like to participate in this 
research. A copy of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference. If 
you have any concerns about your selection or treatment as a research 
participant, please contact the Office of Sponsored Programs, Kepner Hall, 
University of Northern Colorado Greeley, CO  80639; 970-351-2161. 
 
 
 
         
Subject’s Signature    Date 
 
 
         
Researcher’s Signature    
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Please note that University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB has 
published the following Board Document on IRBNet: 
 
Project Title: [474154-3] Mental State Understanding in Older Adults 
Principal Investigator: Rena Kirkland 
 
Submission Type: Amendment/Modification 
Date Submitted: July 16, 2013 
 
Document Type: Approval Letter 
Document Description: Approval Letter 
Publish Date: July 17, 2013 
 
Should you have any questions you may contact Megan Babkes Stellino at 
megan.stellino@unco.edu. 
 
Thank you, 
The IRBNet Support Team 
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Table 13 
 Demographic Characteristics of Sample as Measured by Self-Report 
  
  Frequencies Percentag
e 
 
 Martial Status    
 Never 2 4.8 % 
 Divorced 1 2.4 % 
 Widowed 5 11.9 % 
 Living with significant other 33 78.6 % 
Retired    
 No 9 22.5 % 
 Yes 31 77.5 % 
Exercise    
 Never 6 14.3 % 
 Seldom 6 14.3 % 
 Sometimes 11 26.2 % 
 Often 18 42.9 % 
Health    
 Poor 0 0 
 Fair 3 7.7 
 Good 16 41.0 
 Excellent 20 51.3 
Computers    
 Poor 1 2.5 
 Fair 6 15.0 
 Good 17 42.5 
 Excellent 16 40.0 
Part-time 
work 
   
 No 32 78.0 
 Yes 9 22.0 
Full-time 
work 
   
 No 38 92.7 
 Yes 3 7.3 
Volunteer    
 No 29 70.7 
 Yes 12 29.3 
Homemaker    
 No 35 83.3 
Yes 7 16.7 
 
   
 
 
156 
 
Table 14 
Careers of the Sample  
 
Careers of participants  
Certified public accountant 
College professor  
Computer programmer 
Consulting 
Business professor 
Electrical engineer 
Elementary school teacher 
Estimator of awnings 
Faculty in computer engineering 
Fitness monitor 
Foreign policy 
Golf course ranger 
Hairdresser & Nurse 
Personal fitness trainer 
Physical therapist  
Physician  
Real estate appraisals 
Seamstress 
Software development  
Transcription business for law firm 
Writer/musician  
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Demographics 
 
1.  Gender:   ☐ Male  ☐ Female 
  
2.  Age: ___________  
  
3.  As of today, what is your current marital status? Pick one of the following: 
 
☐ Never married or partnered  
☐ Divorced  
☐ Widowed 
☐ Living or married with significant other 
  
4.   Over the past seven days, how often did you engage in  
sport and/or recreational activities such as jogging, cycling, swimming, singles 
tennis, aerobic dance, skiing, or other similar activities? Pick one of the 
following: 
  
☐ Never 
☐ Seldom (1-2 days)  
☐ Sometimes (3-4 days) 
☐ Often (5-7 days) 
  
5.  How would you rate your perceived health? Pick one of  the following: 
  
☐ Poor 
☐ Fair  
☐ Good  
☐ Excellent  
 
6.  How would you rate your comfort level with computers? 
☐ Poor 
☐ Fair  
☐ Good  
☐ Excellent  
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7.  How many years of education do you have, including any college? _________ 
 
8.  Occupation: (check all that apply) 
 
☐ Currently retired 
 If yes, since what year _________ 
☐ Full-time homemaker 
☐ Volunteer 
☐ Employed full-time** 
☐ Employed part-time** 
** If you are currently employed full or part-time, what kind of work do you do? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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F_version (right-handed) 
 
Thank you for participating in this study! 
  
You will see a room with a woman inside. 
On the left and right walls, there are sometimes red circles pinned on the wall.  
Here is an example: 
 
 
 
On half of the trials, you will respond to how many circles you can see from your 
perspective.  
  
On the other half of the trials, you will respond to how many circles the woman can see 
from her perspective. 
   
During the experiment you will see the following sequence of events: 
  
1) a plus sign 
2) the words YOU or SHE  
3) a number between 0 and 3  
4) the picture of the room  This is where you will make a “yes” or “no” response  
• Answer yes, when the number of circles matches the perspective you were 
told to take (i.e., YOU or SHE) 
• Answer no, when the number of circles does not match the perspective you 
were told to take (i.e., YOU or SHE) 
  
5) After your response, you will be given a feedback (“Correct” or “Wrong”) 
  
It is important that you try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 
We will start with a practice block. Then, there will be 2 test blocks and one more 
practice block. In between the blocks, you can take a break. 
 
As a reminder, try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 
Thanks again for your participation! 
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Figure. 5. Participants Viewed the Following Image Accompanied Verbal Instructions 
Here are two examples 
                        
+ 
YOU 
1 
Correct 
Index 
+ 
SHE 
1 
Correct 
Middle finger 
YES S NO 
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APPENDIX G 
DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS FOR LEVEL-1 VISUAL  
PERSPECTIVE TAKING  
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Table 15 
 
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs without 
Transformations 
  Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 n Statistic Sig. Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Alone        
 Other Consistent 40 .901 .002 .928 .369 .037 .724 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .741 .000 2.448 .369 6.480 .724 
 Self Consistent 40 .890 .001 1.255 .369 1.739 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .798 .000 1.810 .369 3.380 .724 
Dual        
 Other Consistent 40 .731 .000 1.726 .374 3.136 .733 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .824 .000 2.238 .369 5.936 .724 
 Self Consistent 40 .756 .000 2.894 .369 10.239 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .810 .000 2.542 .369 6.904 .724 
Note.  SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3 
 
 
Table 16 
 
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs after 
Transformations 
  Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 n Statistic Sig. Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Alone        
 Other Consistent 40 .948 .058 .557 .369 -.522 .724 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .902 .002 1.166 .369 1.674 .724 
 Self Consistent 40 .964 .222 .583 .369 -.039 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .920 .007 .979 .369 .455 .724 
Dual        
 Other Consistent 40 .935 .021 1.075 .369 1.566 .724 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .952 .086 .464 .374 1.141 .733 
 Self Consistent 40 .937 .025 1.001 .369 1.458 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .911 .004 1.290 .369 2.436 .724 
Note.  SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3 
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Table 17 
 
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Reaction Time without 
Winsorizing  
  Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 n Statistic Sig. Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Alone        
 Other Consistent 40 .901 .002 .93 .37 .04 .72 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .741 .000 2.45 .37 6.48 .72 
 Self Consistent 40 .890 .001 1.26 .37 1.74 .72 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .798 .000 1.81 .37 3.38 .72 
Dual        
 Other Consistent 40 .731 .000 2.55 .37 8.62 .72 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .824 .000 1.73 .37 3.14 .73 
 Self Consistent 40 .756 .000 2.24 .37 5.94 .72 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .810 .000 2.89 .37 10.24 .72 
Note.  SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3 
 
 
Table 18 
 
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Reaction Time after 
Winsorizing  
  Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 n Statistic Sig. Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Alone        
 Other Consistent 40 .950 .073 .560 .369 -.188 .724 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .944 .046 .566 .369 .575 .724 
 Self Consistent 40 .958 .148 .398 .369 -.619 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .925 .012 .733 .369 -.339 .724 
Dual        
 Other Consistent 40 .907 .003 .978 .369 .473 .724 
 Other Inconsistent  40 .957 .136 .660 .374 .909 .733 
 Self Consistent 40 .907 .003 .957 .369 .114 .724 
 Self Inconsistent 40 .964 .232 .398 .369 -.669 .724 
Note.  SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3 
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 APPENDIX H 
DISTRIBTUTION STATISTICS FOR THEORY OF MIND 
AND WORKING MEMORY MEASURES 
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Table 19 
Distribution Statistics for Theory of Mind Story Task, Verbal and Spatial Working 
Memory  
  Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 n Statistic Sig. Statistic SE Statistic SE 
SST        
   Theory of mind 42 .896 .001 -1.110 .365 2.104 .717 
   Control stories  42 .938 .024 -.427 .365 -.602 .717 
Digit span total 42 .964 .213 .461 .365 .437 .717 
   Digit span forward 42 .962 .171 .436 .365 -.327 .717 
   Digit span backward 42 .892 .001 1.166 .365 2.296 .717 
   Digit span sequence 42 .958 .127 -.155 .365 -.527 .717 
Symbol span 42 .986 .883 -.102 .365 -.359 .717 
Note.  SST = Strange stories Task, which includes theory of mind stories and control 
stories (Happé, 1994); SE = standard error; Digit span is a measure of verbal working 
memory and symbol span is a measure of visual working memory from the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (Wechsler, 2008); Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis 
should be < ± 3 
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APPENDIX I 
STATISTICS FOR LEVENE’S TEST OF EQUAL ERROR  
VARIANCES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE  
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Table 20 
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance for the Mixed-design ANOVA 
 
Condition F-test p-value 
Alone   
     Other consistent .572 .454 
     Other inconsistent .155 .696 
      Self consistent .421 .520 
     Self inconsistent 8.023 .007 
Dual   
     Other consistent 1.803 .187 
     Other inconsistent .004 .952 
      Self consistent .233 .632 
     Self inconsistent 3.742 .061 
Note.  Levene’s test is not considered a threat to equal variance unless the p-value is 
< .001; thus, all variables meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  
 
   
 
 
170 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX J 
DESCRIPTIVE STASTICS FOR LEVEL-1 VISUAL 
PERSPECTIVE TAKING TASK: PROCESSING 
COSTS WITH THE NATURAL LOG 
TRANSFORMATION 
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Table 21 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs with 
Natural Log Transformations  
 
 
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Alone      
 Other Consistent 40 6.8382 .21753 6.49 7.35 
 Other Inconsistent  40 7.1353 .37616 6.42 8.34 
 Self Consistent 40 6.8472 .26486 6.41 7.54 
 Self Inconsistent 40 6.9468 .36600 6.47 7.94 
Dual      
 Other Consistent 40  6.8925 .36914 6.31 8.11 
 Other Inconsistent  40 7.1461 .37489 6.18 8.05 
 Self Consistent 40 6.9983 .33442 6.46 8.07 
 Self Inconsistent 40 7.0763 .33737 6.50 8.07 
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APPENDIX K 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISICS FOR LEVEL-1 VISUAL  
PERSPECTIVE TAKING TASK: REACTION  
TIME BEFORE DATA WERE  
WINSORIZED 
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Table 22 
 
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP Task: Reaction Time before Data were Winsorized  
 
  
N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Alone      
 Other Consistent 40 898.20 209.83 587.00 1553.00 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1111.60 304.35 497.00 2033.00 
 Self Consistent 40 940.48 267.06 490.00 1882.00 
 Self Inconsistent 40 978.58 318.79 471.00 1826.00 
Dual      
 Other Consistent 40 970.35 354.47 548.00 2380.00 
 Other Inconsistent  40 1094.65 311.15 483.00 2093.00 
 Self Consistent 40 1064.15 340.47 639.00 2217.00 
 Self Inconsistent 40 1068.28 253.86 664.00 1637.00 
Note.  L-1 VP = level-1 visual perspective taking 
 
 
